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EDITORIAL

A WELCOME ANNOUNCEMENT

With the current number we close the second year of our life, and we are able to make the welcome announcement that our readers will, in future, receive Theology at a reduced price. The reduction involves an element of risk, but it is evident that the magazine is much appreciated by its readers in various parts of the world, and we wish to increase its usefulness. The price is reduced from July onwards to a shilling. Subscribers will have the unexpired portion of their subscription prolonged. Thus, a reader who paid 18s. in January has 9s. left of his subscription, which, at the new rate of 12s. a year, prepaid, will ensure his receiving the magazine up to the March number, 1923. We hope that our supporters will help to justify the reduction in price by encouraging fresh people to become regular subscribers.

For the time being the step we are taking will involve some reduction in size, though there will be occasional enlarged numbers as circumstances may require. We hope that this will be only a temporary measure. For several months past the output of serious theological books has been considerably less in bulk than was the case a year ago, so that there is less to review, and we have every hope that it will be possible, despite the curtailment of space, to maintain to the full both the quality and the variety of the articles. The reviews in future will be arranged by the Editorial Department of S.P.C.K., and Mr. Lowther Clarke has many new plans in hand for the development of the section Miscellanea.

During the past two years, in addition to the work of scholars and thinkers in England, we have published articles or communications dealing with various phases of religious activity and thought in Canada, the United States, South Africa, Australia, India, Italy, France, most of them written by people on the spot. We had hoped by this time to have included an article on the Russian Church from one of the foremost of her scholars, but our readers will understand the difficulty of communication with those parts, and it may be some time before this hope is realized. Meanwhile events in our own country—the Lambeth Conference of 1920 with its subsequent repercussions, the Anglo-Catholic Congress of the same year, the Modern Churchmen's Conference in 1921, and the somewhat circular progress of the National Assembly—have had their echoes in our pages. And so we endeavour, as Sir Thomas Browne puts it, " to follow the great wheel of the Church," by which we move.

THE URGENCY OF EUCHARISTIC REVISION

WE are now imminently threatened with the loss for the second time of an opportunity, missed at its last occurrence in 1661, of undoing a sore mischief wrought in the second Prayer Book in 1552. This evil was the cutting away of all the latter portion of the Consecration Prayer, thereby depriving it of devotional and liturgical elements which have belonged to the Church's treasury of worship from the beginning of the third century and probably from a much earlier date, even apostolic. The precious Anamnesis of the Passion, Resurrection, and Ascension of our Lord, which should follow the Words of Institution as their crown, was discarded, and other pieces were removed to a position after Communion instead of before it. The Church is now increasingly suffering damage from this marring of her Liturgy, proportionate to the increase of spiritual devotion, which wants the good things that have been lost, and the increase of liturgical and historical knowledge, which more and more shows up the changes as departures from primitive Christian tradition.

Though with less light on the subject than we now have, Cosin and some other of the revisers of 1661 were alive to the fact that these changes were the reverse of improvements, and endeavoured to get them remedied. But Convocation could not be moved to action on it. The good lead of the Scottish Liturgy of 1637 was not followed, and the deformation remained, as it still remains. Scotland has gone on to develop her rite in her own way, the kindred American one has arisen, England's daughter churches are beginning to move (as in South and East Africa), but in England a new Prayer Book is being proposed with this central defect in its chief service untouched! In the recent revising Convocation, gallant and prolonged efforts were indeed made to right the wrong, and reached the verge of success. But a minority which would neither have any change itself, nor suffer anyone else to have it, exercised its power to block all action. And there we stand, at this moment.

Certain results of continued inaction on the part of the Church are worthy of consideration. (1) There is a marked increase of the number of churches in which the deficiencies of our Consecration Prayer are supplied from the Roman Canon of the Mass, or the practically identical Sarum Canon. And instead of being slight private devotions of the priest, they tend more and more to become a full celebration of the

Roman Canon, with our Consecration Prayer inserted in it. Yet in most cases those who do this are not Romanizers in any just sense of the term. They are men who realize the devotional inadequacy of our maimed order of service, and, being refused all relief from its poverty, turn to the Missal for what is wanting. If some of them are thereby led on further than is desirable, assuredly not all the blame, nor even the chief weight of it, can justly be laid on them. It rests on those who think that even at this day they can continue to tie the whole Church of England down to such a minimum as our Consecration Prayer has been reduced to at one of the worst epochs of our religious history.

(2) In other churches there is a parallel increase of saying the Prayer of Oblation, and often the Lord's Prayer also, immediately after the Consecration Prayer. Sometimes the defeated Convocation proposal of 1918 is used, in which these transpositions are accompanied by the restoration of the Anamnesis from the first Prayer Book, and the Prayer of Humble Access is put back in its old place just before Communion. There are these various degrees of rearrangement, just as the previously noticed practice of interpolation from the Missal has its various degrees.

(3) There are indications that, besides these groups, there is a far greater mass of dissatisfied feeling, both clerical and lay, in the Church at large. Everywhere there are loyal, earnest, well-informed Churchmen and women, who know that our order is liturgically deficient, and fail to get from it such devotional help as they desire, and have a right to look for in their Liturgy, when they worship at the altar. The undertaking of the revision of the Prayer Book gave many of them a quiet hope of something better, which now is subsiding into a quiet disappointment. They do not advertise their grievance; they go on as before; but the Church should not be content to treat them thus in the forthcoming new Prayer Book, which is supposed to meet the needs of the day.

Revision of the Canon, while sufficient, should be strictly moderate and conservative, in order to find wide general acceptance in the Church. And what is required for conformity to Christian tradition is moderate and unprovocative—chiefly a mere readjustment of the order in which certain of our familiar prayers are said. If the readjustment had been made in 1661, it would long ago have become as much a matter of course to us all as it is to American Churchmen in the use of their better arranged rite. By reuniting the Prayer of Oblation to the Consecration Prayer, the Eucharist is presented to God

before being partaken of, this being the fitting order found in other Liturgies, including the oldest one known, that of Hippolytus of Rome early in the third century after Christ. The restoration of the Anamnesis is an essential point of revision, but it requires only a few absolutely uncontroversial words, "having in remembrance His blessed Passion, mighty Resurrection, and glorious Ascension," to be inserted in the opening sentence of the Prayer of Oblation (after the word "servants"). Not another new word is needed, except the "Wherefore" to link on the Prayer of Oblation to the Consecration Prayer, and the preface "As our Saviour Christ hath commanded and taught us, we are bold to say," by which the Lord's Prayer is next linked on as the crown and completion of the whole Canon. The transfer of the Prayer of Humble Access reunites the Preface and Sanctus to the Consecration Prayer, of which they form the rightful opening, and the transferred Prayer becomes a helpful act of devotion on approaching the sacrament. The Thanksgiving will follow Communion, as it should, instead of being ousted, as at present, by the misplaced Prayer of Oblation.

Such a revision would have the happy effect also of joining the voice of the people with that of the priest in closer association with the Consecration, which in our present rite stands out in peculiar isolation as the prayer of the priest alone. It would also associate once more with the Consecration Prayer that Eucharistic note of thanksgiving, praise, and doxology which is proper to it, but of which it stands shorn in its present reduced state.

It must be recognized that it would be fatal to the general acceptance of a revision to include in it any changes affecting the actual formula of consecration of the bread and wine. We all use our present form as a valid one, and this is the only agreement possible between us all, so diverse and irreconcilable are the views as to how it might be improved upon. It would be exaggeration for anyone to insist on his preference as a *sine quâ non* of revision, in face of the ancient diversities of formula and opinion.

Convocation's proposed improvements in other parts of the order of service are, of course, of small moment compared with the question of the Canon. Any satisfaction one might feel with regard to them is far outweighed by the failure to deal with the greater and more urgent need. If this misfortune cannot be retrieved, the new Prayer Book fails of its purpose from the outset. It would be pessimistic to think that the present check is insuperable, and that nothing can be done. Up, and at it!

E. C. TRENHOLME, S.S.J.E.

THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES IN RECENT CRITICISM

I.

In a former article (see the February number of Theology) I summarized the most important books on the Acts which have been published during the last decade. Since its appearance several others have come to hand which deserve a brief notice. First in importance is the second volume of Foakes-Jackson and Lake's *The Beginnings of Christianity*, which is a monument of international scholarship, the contributors being drawn from England, America, Holland, and Germany. Mr. Hoskyns, in his interesting review in the May number of this journal, did scant justice to the skill and delicately poised judgment of the editors and, to mention the leading contributors, Professors Cadbury and Burkitt. As one responsible for the treatment of a subsidiary issue, I am free to express my admiration for the work of those who have tackled the main problems. The learned editors have provided us with an encyclopædia of facts and theories which for many years will be indispensable to all investigators. The fundamental problem of authorship is treated in a most satisfactory manner. First the tradition is given with great fullness, then the case for the tradition, then the case against it, the whole filling 142 pages.

Windisch states the case against the Lukan authorship with great ability. But let an even more eminent scholar answer him. Eduard Meyer, of Berlin, has recently published two out of three projected volumes on the *Origin and Beginnings of Christianity*. So far he has said little about the Acts, which is reserved for the third volume. But one of the author's judgments is striking—and the verdict of a first-rank scholar who comes to the New Testament from the classics is always of value. He speaks of the bewilderment (*Verwirrung*) into which theologians have fallen as regards this matter as a result of a century's disputations; to say Luke did not write the Third Gospel and the Acts is as if one said Xenophon and Herodotus did not write the works that bear their name. A quotation from Lucian's *True History* may be apposite here. The traveller has visited Hades and conversed with Homer.

"Before many days had passed, I accosted the poet Homer, when we were both disengaged, and asked him, among other things, where he came from; it was still a burning question with us, I explained. . . . Another of my questions was about the so-called spurious books; had he written them or

not ? He said that they were all genuine: so I know now what to think of the critics Zenodotus and Aristarchus and all their lucubrations. Having got a categorical answer on that point, I tried him next on his reason for starting the Iliad with the wrath of Achilles. He said he had no exquisite reason; it just came into his head that way."*

If we could question St. Luke, it is at least possible that he would answer in similar fashion, and that some of our far-fetched explanations would prove beside the mark—" it just came into his head that way."†

The veteran scholar Theodor Zahn has published a commentary on the Acts (Leipzig, 1919, 1921), which displays to the full his massive learning. This is a book which scholars will gladly use; they will know how to make the necessary allowances. But it cannot be said that the author really grapples with the difficulties felt by investigators to-day, nor can one feel much confidence in the judgment of a scholar who maintains the priority of the " Western " text.

A little book by R. Schütz (*Apostel und Jünger*, Giessen, 1921) is of great interest. He maintains that there are two sources in the Acts, distinguishable by their use of the words *apostle* and *disciple* respectively. The apostle source represents the official view of the Church of Jerusalem; the disciple-source, that of the Hellenistic Church into which St. Paul was admitted at his conversion, and which is the product of Galilean discipleship. The followers of our Lord during His ministry were from the first indifferent to the Law, like their Master, and partially Hellenized in their outlook. The movement spread northwards to Damascus and Antioch. The attempt to make Christianity into a new Judaism, with its centre at Jerusalem, was a development not true to type. The theory is clever and suggestive and may prove of real importance. The origin of Catholicism, which was confessedly syncretistic, is now pushed back into the period of the Galilean ministry ! To examine Schütz's thesis would require far more study than I have been able to give. It may turn out to be ingenious sophistication; or, on the other hand, a line of thought as fruitful as that found in Schweitzer's famous book. In so far, however, as it depends on source-criticism of the Acts it must be extremely precarious. None of the former theories have won general acceptance, and, as Professor Burkitt points

* Quoted by Quiller-Couch, *The Writing of English*, p. 228.

† I feel now that this applies to much of my own work on the Septuagint in Foakes-Jackson and Lake's second volume. The article was written before the war and in eight years one's views change. If St. Luke quoted the LXX, it was as we quote Shakespeare—as a rule unwittingly—using the common stock of phrases current in his circle.

out in *The Beginnings of Christianity*, vol. ii., the problem is really insoluble. Had the Second Gospel perished, no one could have reconstructed St. Luke's source for much of his Gospel. The chances of success with the Acts are very small.*

I had hoped in this article to give the reader an answer to the question, Where do we stand now as a result of another ten years' discussion of Acts and its problems? But the task is too difficult; nothing less than a small book would be needed. All I shall attempt is to give some personal impressions after reading many books on the subject.

II.

Recent research has been largely concerned with two problems—the personality of the author of Acts, and the sources which he used. I have already said that Professor Cadbury's arguments, disproving the alleged medical language, seem unanswerable; but the strength of the position that a companion of St. Paul wrote the Acts, which companion can hardly be other than the man designated by tradition—namely, St. Luke—is not affected thereby. As to sources, the second book *ad Theophilum* is probably based upon documents, as is the first book. But the problem, which may be stated thus: Luke : Mark and Q :: Acts : x, cannot be worked out satisfactorily. There are two disturbing factors. In the first place, the relation of Luke to Q is beset with difficulties; no one really knows of what Q consisted.† And, secondly, if the writer participated in the history of his second book, any documents he may have had at his disposal would have been less important in his eyes than his own memories or the oral traditions of his friends. Unless new evidence should turn up, we must judge the problem of sources to be insoluble.

But the controversy about author and sources is, after all, of secondary importance, except in so far as it bears on the trustworthiness of Acts. At present the conservative and radical schools are so far apart that they can hardly even fight. Considerable concessions are needed on both sides before any agreement is possible. The literary criticism of the Synoptic Gospels is now settled in its main results, though widely different deductions are drawn from them. So we must not despair of reaching some agreed conclusions with regard to the Acts. The radical critics must give up their absurd scepticism

* Schütz is not alone in his views. Meyer analyses the sources of St. Mark in a similar manner, finding two parallel documents, one of which uses "apostle" and the other "disciple." And a recent English book (V. Macmunn, *Neglected Galilee*, London, 1922) follows the same lines.

† See below for Canon Streeter's theory.

which leads them to doubt everything that cannot be proved accurate. And the conservatives must recognize the difficulties which beset the investigator. As my former article was largely devoted to the weak points of radical criticism, it may be useful here to mention some of the leading difficulties, indicating how they may be met.

1. If a few extremists are disregarded, critics are agreed as to the accuracy of the travel-narrative. But this agreement does not apply to the early chapters of Acts. St. Luke is obviously using sources; have we any confidence in his ability to discriminate between historical and unhistorical elements in his documents? The stories of the Ascension and Pentecost bristle with difficulties, which will be found discussed in any critical commentary. My own views on these narratives will probably not commend themselves to either side. Without doubting the substantial accuracy of chapters i. and ii., I am yet inclined to concede that they are not historical in the strictest sense of the word—in the sense, for example, that St. Paul's escape from Damascus is historical. History, strictly speaking, is the description of events on the human plane. For its own purposes it chooses to ignore the supernatural; and rightly so, for, when great events occur which are primarily happenings in a higher sphere of reality, though they have their outward manifestations to our senses, the tools at the disposal of the historian become inadequate. The Ascension and Pentecost fall into line with the Birth of Christ and His Resurrection as events which *ex hypothesi* cannot be completely authenticated by the ordinary processes of history. They are more rather than less true, but the element of faith—loving trust in God's beneficent purpose for humanity manifested with overwhelming power at the origination of the Church—is necessarily present, and I cannot convey my conviction to those who reject my premises. The difficulties of the narrative, then, are due in the main to the fact that the author is putting into words what is in large measure beyond the power of words to describe.

2. Among the difficulties in the early chapters the story of Ananias and Sapphira is conspicuous. Conservative scholars have suggested that it is a " tendencious " exaggeration of the purity of the primitive Church. Many will own to a feeling of discomfort in reading the passage, but can we be certain that St. Luke had any such feeling in recording, or St. Peter in inflicting, if he did inflict, the punishment? We cannot imagine the scene taking place in Lambeth Palace, but many undoubtedly historical actions of Jeremiah and Ezekiel would be equally incredible in a modern clergyman. What, after all, is more likely than that St. Peter sternly rebuked these

first offenders against the Church's unity, that he handed them over to Satan for the destruction of the flesh, and that they died of fright ?

3. If the modern theory about the Seven is accepted, St. Luke seems to have misunderstood their position. Instead of being primarily deacons, they exercised the ministry of the word to Greek-speaking Jews. Quite possibly he realized this, but thought it an academic question. The important thing to him was the ministry of deacons so familiar to his readers. Whether or no the Seven were the historic origin of the order was of little consequence. They were at least the first and typical response to the need, always felt in the Church, of providing help for the higher spiritual officers.

4. St. Stephen's speech introduces in an acute form the problem of the speeches. Whereas in the earlier speeches of St. Peter there are remarkable fragments of primitive Christology, this speech reads like a polemic against the Jews such as must have been common in sermons of the author's day. Did St. Luke feel at liberty to compose speeches in the Thucydidean manner, or had he always notes at his disposal ? Certainly we cannot imagine him having access to the archives in which the letter from Lysias to Felix was preserved, or even to any record of Gamaliel's speech. But just when we are disposed to concede that the speeches are the free composition of the writer, we are confronted with the primitive elements contained in them (in St. Stephen's speech as well as in St. Peter's speeches), and are obliged to suspend our judgment.

5. The order of events in chapters viii.-xv. is open to grave objection. A simple solution of the vexed problem of the Apostolic Council is to suppose that its true place is before chapter xiii. Such a rearrangement presents few difficulties. Every writer is confronted with the problem of how to arrange his matter. If a modern author gives up the chronological for the logical order he warns his readers. St. Luke, if we may judge from his treatment of the Markan matter in the Gospel, would have claimed the right to disregard strict chronology on occasion. Probably the point would have seemed to him of small importance.

6. It would be tedious to set out the well-known discrepancies between Galatians and Acts xv. But writers have been far too severe upon Acts. J. Weiss expresses a prevailing opinion when he says that the contemporary must necessarily be preferred to the later account. As if a hundred different causes may not operate to make a later narrative more accurate ! As if an English newspaper published in the autumn of 1914, being contemporary evidence, is necessarily more trustworthy

on the subject of a Russian army passing through England than a post-war history! Galatians is very difficult to understand because it puts the Apostle's case for those who knew the background and needed not to be reminded of it. St. Luke is accused of suppressing the truth. "The Acts," says J. Weiss (*Das Urchristentum*, p. 207), "covered this painful scene with the mantle of love." If St. Luke did this, all honour to him. He knew that any temporary disagreement between the two great Apostles was as nothing compared with their underlying unity and love. Writing a history in later years for practical purposes, he would have been untrue to the facts had he emphasized a passing quarrel.

7. St. Luke is charged with "schematism" in that he has constructed a parallel scheme of miracles, etc., for St. Peter and St. Paul. The obvious answer is that two men setting out on the same errand in similar surroundings will probably have the same experiences. St. Luke has naturally delighted in this, and in an unobtrusive and artistic manner drawn out the parallels.

8. Some find a difficulty in St. Luke's suppression of "the collection"; this was in the forefront of St. Paul's thoughts, but in Acts we have only one brief and misleading reference to it. The writer here, as so often, is "tendencious." The Jews are the hated opponents and must always be put in the wrong; he cannot imagine his hero continuing in another form the temple-tax. But what writer to-day does not know the difficulty of deciding how to treat a subject to which he cannot do justice without giving up considerable space? This he is loath to do since the subject is of little or no present interest. He solves the difficulty as a rule by a mere allusion so as to show his knowledge without overloading his narrative. St. Luke did the same. That phase of Church life had passed away, and to dwell upon it would have been mere antiquarianism. But he gives one reference (Acts xxiv. 17) that those who know may realize he could say more if he wished.

9. St. Luke, it is objected, writes history with a purpose. He chooses his material and sets it forth in order to illustrate certain theses—that Christianity is a *religio licita*, and that it is the true Judaism. Could we pay him a greater compliment than to say that he was an artist who with skilful fingers painted a picture of the primitive Church, giving light and shade, and emphasizing those tendencies which the course of events showed to have had a future before them?

III.

In like manner we might discuss other objections raised to the narrative of Acts and answer them in a more or less plausible manner. An impartial observer of the debate would probably notice an underlying agreement between the two sides, in that both suppose the historian to be separated by a number of years from the events he describes. This is, I think, obvious. St. Luke regards the past with the serenity of one who looks upon the struggle from a safe distance. The point cannot be pressed, for time is relative and at certain epochs history is made very rapidly; processes which normally take a century were compressed into a generation at the beginning of the Christian era. For this reason I see no insuperable difficulty in supposing Acts to have been written before St. Paul's death, but a date about 80 A.D. is more satisfactory.

English readers are frequently annoyed by the stress which German scholars lay on the part played by redactors of the books of the Bible. I should like to plead with them for the recognition of "R," especially as I frequently have to be a redactor myself. As Editorial Secretary of a publishing society I have learned that it is rarely possible to put out a religious book intended for use by simple folk without a certain amount of editing. The problem does not arise in the same way with an ordinary publisher, but when the publisher has to justify his actions to a considerable body of supporters, if not to a whole Church, he must exercise great care. Let us suppose a manuscript (A) as it leaves the author's pen, and let us call the completed book B. B, if it bears marks of the Committee's criticisms (R), $=A+R$. But this is not all. Anticipating the Committee's requirements, I sometimes discuss alterations with the author at a preliminary stage, and he modifies his MS. to meet my criticisms (R^1). Further alterations are made by the Committee, so that the final result is $A+R^1+R^2$.* I imagine Roman Catholic scholars go through a similar process before *Nihil Obstat* and *Imprimatur* are secured. The needs of the Church are the same in all ages, and it seems to me inherently probable that most of the books of the New Testament were edited for Church use. In some cases very little alteration was required. But out of three, possibly more, letters of St. Paul to the Corinthians two books for reading in Church seem to have been made. The textual problems of Romans point to the activity of editors. The editors of St. John appear plainly in John xxi. 24. So the works *ad Theophilum* were probably

* No alterations of course are made without the consent of the author.

edited before they were accepted by the Church* for general use. This conclusion is supported by the state of the text. Clearly there was a pre-canonical time when alterations were freely made. I see no difficulty, then, in conceding to the majority of continental scholars the existence of R, though I believe St. Luke wrote well enough in the first instance to make R's labours very light. And there is the possibility that R was St. Luke himself, revising for general use his own work, intended in the first instance for Theophilus.

IV.

These desultory remarks may perhaps be allowed to end with an indication of some tasks before scholars in so far as Acts is concerned. (1) Canon Streeter's very remarkable article in the *Hibbert Journal* for October, 1921, will probably be historical in Synoptic criticism. He shows that the non-Markan parts of Lk. *are* the Gospel, and the Markan parts are interpolations. For Mt., Mk. is the main source; for Lk., Q (the non-Markan parts shared with Mt.) + L (the non-Markan parts peculiar to Lk.). Q+L may be called "proto-Luke," and it lays before the editor of the Third Gospel. The probable author was St. Luke himself; perhaps it was written at Cæsarea. Canon Streeter suggests that St. Luke edited his own earlier work, prefixing chapters i. and ii., and interpolating from Mk. "Proto-Luke," then, was entirely independent of Mk. and a source of equal value to Mk. No student of the New Testament should fail to study this brilliant simplification. Now recent literary criticism has proved that the prologue to the Gospel is intended to apply to the whole composite work. It remains for someone, preferably Canon Streeter himself, to work out the application of the theory to Acts.

(2) There is still work to be done on Codex Bezæ and its allies. Let us suppose as a working hypothesis that the "Western" text of Acts is an early second-century paraphrastic text. The alterations made, either by a deliberate revision or by a succession of scribes animated by similar ideas, should give us a welcome glimpse into the mental processes of the early Christians. So far as I know, the task of comparing this text with the little we know of these processes from other sources has not been attempted. A University Seminar would find it congenial.

(3) There are two sharply contrasted views of the primitive Christology which appears in the speeches of the early chapters of Acts. Some scholars find here a priceless relic of early (Adoptionist?) views. Certain radicals paradoxically call it

* Probably the Church of Rome.

post-Pauline; similar inability to understand the heights of Paulinism is displayed in 1 Clement. Now this is an issue that might be decided once for all by a competent little monograph. At the same time, the other alleged similarities between Acts and 1 Clement, proving that the two documents belong to the same period, might be investigated.

(4) So far the suggested tasks have been in the realm of literary criticism. Mr. Hoskyns has done good service by reminding us of the limitations of this method and the importance of bringing psychological and missionary considerations to bear upon Acts. St. Paul's dream at Troas is the most natural thing in the world to a missionary, in whose experience dreams are an important factor in the spread of the Gospel. We want more monographs like Mosiman's on speaking with tongues (*Das Zungenreden*), in which psychological phenomena of the present day are made to illustrate and corroborate the New Testament narratives. There must be many missionaries who can say that this or that line of action, considered improbable by literary critics, is just what theirs would be in similar circumstances. It has probably never occurred to them that any sensible critic would raise objections to St. Luke's narrative, so the actual collection of instances would have to be made by a scholar familiar both with radical criticism and missionary records.

W. K. Lowther Clarke.

ETERNAL PUNISHMENT

There is more than one weighty reason for reviving discussion on the dread subject of the destiny of impenitent sinners.

1. Perhaps the simplest and most unassailable is that the space it occupies in the Gospels, the tremendous emphasis with which Christ delivered the sentences in question, and the fashion in which the doctrine in its sternest meaning is interwoven with the Gospel message, so as to be unaffected if critical doubt is thrown on one of a few prominent texts—these facts taken together make it a procedure of extraordinary presumption to ignore this side of Christian teaching. Whatever view we come to take of the whole question, it cannot be denied that the teaching comes from Christ; for no man would have invented it. What possible excuse, then, can be found for the practice of reticence now prevailing? The laity have long diagnosed the situation: the parsons, they admit, used to teach the people about Hell, but now there is too much uncertainty about the matter for any really alarming utterances to be heard,

and in consequence the religious atmosphere is of a very different tone from that which must have prevailed in earlier days. Perhaps the shortest way of describing the difference would be to say that nowadays popular religion is divested of the essential element of awe. The word itself is very seldom heard. Moreover, the excision of severity from the Gospel message, not by attack or argument or refutation, but simply by omission, is coincident with the demand, heard repeatedly since the War, that we should return to the teaching of Christ as the only hope of saving civilization.

But how if the teaching of Christ includes the dogma of Eternal Punishment?

2. If God did not reveal the doctrine, it is most noteworthy and profoundly significant that man must have elaborated it and accepted it. In that case the plain inference would be that, as the Dean of St. Paul's puts it, it is a necessity of thought.

3. On the bare chance of this being so, the discarding of it would be insanity, since the practical result on morality, social and individual alike, would inevitably be a growing *incuria*, a general vague but potent belief that nothing matters very much in the long-run—first, in questions of belief; before long, in conduct. No observer of modern life could deny that this result has already occurred.

If, then, the question is not to be burked, how should it be handled? Certainly not by a cool balancing of texts from the New Testament: for the difficulties are not most acutely felt by those who have disregarded the teaching of the Church as given in the Bible, but by those who are disposed to show it all reverence, but cannot reconcile it with their moral consciousness. If in that region they are uneasy, the relief they require has nothing to do with piling up evidence of the terrible message being part of the Gospel. They are not of the multitude who disbelieve the doctrine because they dislike it; but of those who cannot help believing it, though it makes them shudder, and though it conflicts in their minds with the sense of the love of God—the secret of all hope in this life and in the life to come.

Therefore, any handling of the subject which can afford the slightest relief to the perplexities of serious-minded people —and with those who are not serious we have no concern— must start with a sympathetic admission that there is a very real difficulty: that is to say, it is possible to insist on a doctrine based, not on the most extreme affirmations of mediæval fanatics, but on the sayings of Christ Himself, in such a way as seriously to jeopardize, if they do not annihilate altogether, two fundamental postulates essential to our peace of mind— (1) the everlastingness of God's love for all His children; (2) that

nothing either felt in the present or foreboded in the future can make it necessary to believe that Creation is either wholly or in part a failure.

Now, it is plain that this challenge calls for something like a restatement of the doctrine. When such a restatement is attempted there is a certain fashion of justifying the attempt, as if some scientific or philosophical evidence had come to light which made it no longer possible to put the doctrine in its old clear-cut form; and, as often happens, the result is not a restatement of the old doctrine, but a statement of a new one. Meantime, it should be noted, though it generally is not, that the motive of the attempt has nothing to do with science or philosophy, but arises out of the difficulty above mentioned, which has been felt equally by all classes of people, ignorant and learned alike. If this simple fact had been more generally borne in mind, a good deal of scholastic disputation would have been saved.

It is clear that there are two ways of meeting this difficulty. One is to mitigate the dogma till it becomes tolerable to our minds. Thus, Westcott and many others have pointed out certain texts—very few—which seem to give a faint hint of Universalism—the final full and complete salvation and blessedness of all mankind. This doctrine has repeatedly been suggested, but, briefly, it may be said that men in the large have not dared to affirm it. Yet in England, at any rate, the fashionable attitude towards the dogma has been something of a suspense of judgment which virtually amounts to a denial. But, if Christ's utterances are terrible, it is sheer insanity to ignore them, especially as the tone of the whole Bible from start to finish is to insist with all possible urgency on the appalling gravity of our earthly probation. If anything like Universalism were to be taught as true, one of the consequences certainly would be that quite three-quarters of the Bible would lose all significance. For not only would the denunciations become unmeaning, but the messages of God's infinite mercy also.

Other mitigations might be mentioned, many of them supremely attractive, especially the one advocated by Langton Clark, to the effect that repentance is possible after death, but that a judgment or separation takes place at death into two groups of saved: those for whom repentance is no longer necessary, the fully redeemed, and those on a permanently lower level, who have to be disciplined till they are in full reconciliation with God. Or, again, it has been insisted on with unanswerable cogency that God's mercy is everlasting, and also that the physical torture theory was the outcome of a very brutal stage in human development, and so on.

All these and sundry others I pass by, in view of the dominating fact that they are none of them mentioned by our Lord or the Apostles, and only incidentally by the greatest Fathers of the Church. The inference to be drawn is of the highest importance. Orthodoxy in this matter does not mean a reluctant assent to a dogma forced upon us, but a tranquil assurance that in reality there is no direct conflict between that which has been revealed to the Church and those deep moral instincts implanted in us by our Maker. Further, that in using the expression "in reality" we mean that our knowledge of the purpose of Creation and the scheme of salvation of mankind from evil is so grotesquely and unspeakably imperfect, so utterly disproportionate to the essentials of the matter, that to base upon it any moral judgment whatever is a monstrous absurdity even from the intellectual point of view alone, to say nothing of the submission of mind and suspension of judgment which have always been enjoined upon a recalcitrant humanity.

But this proposition needs to be very carefully weighed before we proceed to the next point. We are seeking an answer to the question why Christ told us so little, when a few words would have saved His followers from the terrible, devastating errors of later times: the imaginings of eternal physical torture and predestination to damnation. It might be said that as an educator our Lord did not simplify the problem, any more than He helped the Church to a decision on the inevitable practical question told of in Acts xv., His object evidently being that Christians might be trained to find out for themselves all that, with the help of the Holy Spirit, was within the compass of their faculties. This answer, however, is unsatisfying, in that the solution of the perplexity seems to have required always, not a practical decision on a course of policy to be pursued, but a speculative insight into mysteries which has been denied to the human mind. In other words, I would hazard the conjecture that if Christ had explained how His message about impenitent sinners was to be reconciled with the love of God we should not have understood His words. If this is true, it may be that the question is resolved for us already in some of the deepest passages of the Bible or in the teachings of science, but that we cannot take them in, and probably will not as long as we are "in this generation."

Hence the question seems to require a fresh form of statement. We are inclined to ask why God has withheld from us the faculties for seeing the solution, if solution there be, of a perplexity which threatens to undermine our confidence in His love or in His power. But no sooner is the question posed

than we are pulled up short at our own presumption, and are reminded of Carlyle's scathing rebuke to a self-complacent critic of the scheme of things that it was a pity he had not been consulted at the Creation. As deep down as we can go, then, into the heart of the subject, the more we are led to surmise that there is some profound and vital connexion between our ignorance in this matter and the training of our characters as children of the Most High.

For when Jesus told us that we are to become like children, was He not thinking of the peculiar beauty of the relation of the little child to his father in respect of the absence of all suspicion or of the smallest wish to criticize ? This is a natural, essential quality of childhood; not an idiosyncrasy of one child and not another, but a universal characteristic, so that a little child in whom the critical sense undermined the sense of gratitude would be something of a monster; but what would be a more grievous fact by far would be the impossibility of training him as a free moral agent "drawn by the cords of love." As soon as the smallest element of suspicion enters into the relation of a son to his father, the inevitable result is either severance, or bargaining, or coercion. The first and third are, in regard to man and God, unthinkable. The second is forbidden by the whole tenor of the Gospel teaching; by the character-studies in the Old Testament; by the Prophets and the testimony of all truly righteous men from St. Paul onwards to the present day. Yet bargaining with God is the commonest cause of wrecked lives and perverted aspirations. All discontent, all despair, all preferring of Mammon-service to the service of God—in short, every form of counterfeit goodness—mean that man accepts God's offer of Heaven, but adds one or more conditions. Perhaps the very commonest of those insisted on to-day is that our beliefs shall be dictated by the requirements of our limited understanding applied to infinite mysteries.

For, let it be plainly stated, the refusal to accept the Bible view of God's judgments is a defiance of His law as is the refusal to be bound, say, by the law of Christian marriage, or of honest dealing with the weak, or wilful forgetfulness of any of God's claims. It is self-assertion in the one point where our submissiveness is put to a very crucial test; and if we fail in that we fail in all.

The objection is at once raised that the two cases are not parallel or even similar. In defying the moral law man defies what he knows to be Divine or at least unassailably true; whereas this dogma itself traverses the two propositions above stated, both of which are interwoven with all our deepest,

truest knowledge of God, and therefore, unless modified, must be discarded; and, after all, there is always the doubtfulness of the text to fall back upon.

This contention is answered by the question, Have we any right to judge of the dogma being in agreement or disagreement with Revelation, which we know to be not only partial, but given, so to speak, in tiny fragments even to the greatest of our thinkers? The alternative to judging is accepting with submission and waiting for further light; and unquestionably that is the tone and temper of the childlike spirit. As an assistance to the maintaining of that temper the two following considerations are worth attention: one of them being such as appeals to the simple; the other to those whose perplexity is not only of the heart, but the intellect as well. I take the latter first.

(*a*) Father Benson lays it down that to the finite mind all infinite truth (or truth about the Infinite) must come in the form of a contradiction; further, that if we could understand it it would not be true. So Westcott is recorded to have said that he never felt satisfied he was on the right road in his quest for truth unless he came upon a flat contradiction. Many philosophers could be quoted in corroboration, the impulse in this direction having been given, I presume, mainly by Hegel.* In philosophy the primeval puzzle of the relation between the objective and subjective is an outstanding illustration, while in theology it is only necessary to reflect on the Sacraments, or Prayer, or Freewill, to be reminded of the same principle; even as from science we gather that the settlement of the claims of Matter and Mind is as far off as ever.

Now, if we lay hold of this truth we are ready for the next step, which is to recognize the law of intellectual honesty—viz., that we should set ourselves with unvarying steadfastness to hold with equal firmness both sides of that which we call a contradiction, when it is the form in which Infinity steals into our minds, though the prospect of logically reconciling them has to be relegated to a very dim and distant future. Thus, in proportion as the minds of any generation are biassed in favour *either* of the doctrine of God's love *or* of His severity, error must result. Hence we have had to pass through the dark horror of the Calivnistic teaching. Then came the reaction in which we are still caught, and popular Christianity is steeped

* Hegelians have been criticized, as by Sidgwick shortly before his death, that they fail to distinguish the propositions which have to be rejected because they contradict our reason from those which, because they do so, have to be accepted. But is there any truth whatsoever which, even in being stated, does not begin to shade off into error? The human mind is perpetually passing from truth to falsehood and back again without having discovered a line of demarcation.

in the poisonous idea that there is nothing more needed to be learnt about God but His kindness. It is an idea startlingly at variance with Scripture from beginning to end; and its fruit in modern life is the shrinking from suffering as from an intolerable evil, though in our heart of hearts we know that when borne for Christ's dear sake, it is the secret of all heroism; the hall-mark of all high endeavour; the keynote of redemption; and that only through suffering has the power of our Father's infinite love been made manifest to His children.

(*b*) So we pass on to the challenge offered us by the double fact that we are unable to reconcile the doctrine with our deepest intuitions, but that meantime the multitude which no man can number, not only hereafter, but now in this vale of tears, nourish "a living hope"; and it is essential to our right-mindedness that we make clear to ourselves to what this hope points. Some years ago a writer published a book entitled *Eternal Hope*, the hope expressed being that the doom of impenitent sinners might turn out to be less terrible than had been believed. That is to say, he strove to persuade us that there was no reason why God should not view such things as sin, salvation, guilt, etc., with our eyes; though we know scarcely anything of any of them except that huge tracts of all such subjects are to the greatest minds among mankind vast and unfathomable mysteries, no matter how life-giving may be to us the wondrous whispers of truth which we have been privileged to appropriate, or how powerfully each fresh ray of light beckons us to press on. In regard to sin, indeed, one is reminded of the solemn words, "Thou thoughtest wickedly that I am even such a one as thyself." For who can deny the wickedness of supposing that we, soaked for countless generations in the poison of sin, can form the faintest idea of its foul malignity in the sight of the Most High?

But if, then, our hope does not and cannot lie in the direction of modifying what has been revealed, there yet remains a glorious forecast of which St. Peter must have been thinking when he connected the "living hope" of the Christian with the Resurrection of the Saviour. It is that "*for us men and for our salvation*" God has withheld from the human mind the power to reconcile the seeming antinomy: that we should be unable to probe to the bottom of this matter according to the law of our being. It is not a wilful shortcoming on our part, but a Divine ordinance, and part of the constitution of things, for which, if we are believers in Him, we are bound to give thanks. It brings, indeed, a double blessing: First, it leaves us face to face with a stupendous terror, which He has either unveiled or caused man to unveil to himself; and as the Angel of Judg-

ment confronted Balaam on his sinful quest, so we wayward mortals, perpetually lulled by self-complacency into the sleep of death, the truckling to manifold forms of Mammon, are again and again reminded that the moment we allow ourselves to drift, to prefer our dead selves to the living God, we are nearing eternal perdition. There is little enough fear surviving in modern minds; suppose it were altogether quenched, would there be one godly man left?

Or to put it from the opposite side: If we listen to the warnings of Rev. iii., we learn that the most deadly obstacle to the establishment of the Kingdom of Heaven, according to Scripture, is lukewarmness or indifference—the prevailing heresy rife in our own country that, first in matters of doctrine, later in regard to simple obedience to the moral law, nothing really is of any permanent consequence. Now, it will hardly be disputed that no indifferent man has ever for five minutes in his life sincerely contemplated Hell as a reality. Among the lukewarm and the indifferent there are many who cannot abandon all belief in God; and to these their heedlessness of the moral law and the claims of the spiritual life, their severe pertinacious defiance of the Gospel ethics, all mean an acceptance of something like Universalism. In other words, any mitigations of the terrible message which could satisfy our natural reason would, if widely accepted, sound the knell of ruin for the world.

But if they are plainly pernicious for the present life, what warrant have we to suppose they are fitted for the life to come ?*

It is probable that our craving for some palliation of the dogma arises from our total incapacity to realize the horror of sin. If it were due to any uncorrupt desire, how could the loving Saviour have refused to meet it? His silence on the subject, though most terrifying to our minds, must have been maintained in love for our souls.

But has He given no hint? One only, but that is of such infinite range and depth and power that we may take it, pro-

* *Cf.* Browning's *Easter Day,* Part II., noting how despair sets in as soon as doctrines unassailably reasonable for this life are applied to eternity. Herein is some answer to a plausible plea which would commend a drastic modification of the gospel message—viz., that as we have come to believe in development in our religious conceptions, we may suppose that the filling up of the great gap in our knowledge, the reconciling of infinite love with infinite severity, has been left to the Church under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, Christ thus dealing with us as with free moral agents being trained for eternity.

Now we have to obey St. John's injunction, "Try the spirits ;" and it is well to note the difference between Christ's restatements of Old Testament teaching and ours. They are distinguished by two characteristics, towards both of which the educated world of to-day is antipathetic : (1) Our restatements tend to accommodate revelation to human reason ; Christ's always made it more difficult for reason. (2) Ours, like all heresies, tend to undermine the sense of responsibility ; Christ's immensely increases it.

foundly thankful to God for all that He has withheld no less than for all that He has vouchsafed to disclose. All His teaching went to emphasize His chief interpreter's summing up of all our hopes: God is Love. On this we may build the conviction that, however unspeakable in their terribleness the utterances of God's warnings are, the treatment of each single soul by its Maker will be the expression of pure, unvarying, and everlasting love.

By way of summary. The facts with which we are confronted are as follows: From ages past the greatest minds among men have believed that for each single soul, as well as for families and nations, this life is an unspeakably solemn probation; for on man's conduct of it eternal issues depend, which will be disclosed by a Divine Judgment: all mankind being divided into two groups, the saved and the lost.*

Inferior minds have tried to soften down the message. Somehow their efforts have not been taken as solid contributions to human thought. There remains the alternative: that we accept without mitigation the tremendous warnings, and recognize that God has withheld from us, for reasons which we can partially discern, the faculty for reconciling His severity with His love. But along with the warnings He has taught some among the sons of men to utter the glad confidence of the true childlike spirit; which, to our amazement, we notice is based, not on any craven whittling away of the prophecies of doom, but on a full, fair, and open-eyed recognition of the uttermost terror of their tone. We are allowed to see that submission to the message has immensely corroborated their faith, kindled their hope of sharing the "new knowledge" hereafter, and filled them with the "fire of love," which has brought Heaven down to this sin-stricken earth. For it has been based, not on human wisdom, but on knowledge of the heart of God, granted to those who with yearning desire have communed with Him.

From these seers two utterances have come down—different, indeed, in tenor, but profoundly suggestive. Ruskin said: "God brings finite good out of finite evil: why not infinite good out of infinite evil?" But far more celestial are the words of the Hebrew prophet and singer: "The fear of the Lord is clean, and endureth for ever: the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether. More to be desired are they than gold, yea, than much fine gold: sweeter also than honey and the honey-comb. Moreover by them is Thy servant taught: and in keeping of them there is great reward."

E. LYTTELTON.

* Martineau, in a striking passage in his *Types of Ethical Theory*, mentions among these leaders of thought Plato, Dante, Milton, and Pascal.

THE DUAL IDEA OF THE SACRAMENTS

Professor Kennett, in his little book on *The Last Supper, its Significance in the Upper Room*, has appealed to those who are unable to accept the Roman or Anglo-Catholic teaching on the Holy Communion to put forward a less negative and more constructive statement of their faith. He complains also that the Church of England leaves it without "attempting to suggest in what sense or in what way 'the strengthening and refreshing of our souls' can be brought about 'by the Body and Blood of Christ.'"

Again, in the December number of Theology, the Editor notes with satisfaction that men are seeking "for synthesis rather than for victory," and urges "the duty of examining the standpoints of other schools of thought within the Church, with a view to effective agreement."

The present writer is therefore emboldened to put forward a plain statement upon a view of the Holy Communion which he has not often found expressed elsewhere, but which seems to him rooted in the fundamental ideas symbolized both in that Sacrament and also in Holy Baptism. He believes that it gives an answer to the question, Why did the Lord command to be received not only Bread, but also Wine? He suggests that two radically contrasted ideas underlie the Bread and the Wine, and that an appreciation of this point might tend towards a synthesis between the teaching of two different schools of thought in the Church, and might prove acceptable to minds which do not find satisfaction in the teachings of either side.

The thesis, then, here put forward is this: That there is an essential duality in both the major Sacraments, a rhythm of Death and Life; and that the benefits whereof we are partakers by their means are best understood and received when they are regarded as illustrating and effectuating the favourite theme of the mystics—"*Mors janua vitæ.*"

I.—*Holy Baptism.*—Let us pave the way for the main subject before us, that of the Holy Communion, by treating first of the initiatory Sacrament of Holy Baptism, for the contention is that the two are all of one piece, and that they are framed of purpose on the same lines, so that the second shall in its symbolism continue and perpetuate what is begun by the first.

1. What, then, is the symbolism of Holy Baptism? Two main lines of explanation have been given.

(1) The first, and simpler of the two, is that the washing with water is a symbol of *the washing away of sins*. This seems

to have been the idea in the mind of St. John the Baptist. St. Mark and St. Luke both narrate that he "preached the baptism of repentance unto remission of sins." This was the first idea of it conveyed to Saul of Tarsus: "Arise, and be baptized, and wash away thy sins."

(2) On the other hand, all great ideas, all deep symbols, contain in them the germ of far more than appears upon the surface. Their values become deepened and heightened as men's minds brood over them. During the twenty years or more between his conversion and the writing of the Epistle to the Romans St. Paul had arrived at a new and deeper view of the symbolism of Baptism, a view which is embedded in the phraseology of our Public Baptism of Infants. He saw that the immersion in the water and the emersion from it had the nature of a dramatic representation of the death, burial, and resurrection of our Lord, and that the dual idea of *man's death to his old nature and the arising of a new nature out of that death* was vividly shown forth in the rhythm of the action. "We were buried with Him through Baptism into death: that like as Christ was raised from the dead . . . so we also might walk in newness of life" (Rom. vi. 4). And from this he rises to a magnificent application of auto-suggestion: "Even so reckon ye also yourselves to be dead unto sin, but alive unto God in Christ Jesus" (ver. 11).

The present writer was only recently attempting to teach the upper standards of his rural day-school "in what sense and in what way" the benefits of Holy Baptism can be made real to them. Following the Syllabus of the Norwich Diocesan Association of Schools, we had reached the central action of Public Baptism, where the priest is directed to "dip the child in the water discreetly and warily." This was illustrated from the prayer, "Grant that the old Adam in this child may be so buried, that the new man may be raised up in him." The picture of Death's Door from Blake's illustrations to Blair's *Grave* was then shown. "There," it was said to them, "is your old Adam—your old temper, or laziness, or falsehood —going into the font! There is the new man—the nature of the Lord Jesus—rising up in you as you come up out of the font! Whenever you feel the old, bad temper coming up again, say to yourself, 'That is not my real nature now. I left that old nature behind in the font. I have a new nature given me—the kind, loving temper of the Lord Jesus. I am dead unto sin: I am alive unto God.'" In some such way the dual idea of the initiatory sacrament can be psychologically suggested to the growing child of to-day.

2. These two lines of explanation interlace with one another through the Prayer-Book Service—on the one hand, "the mystical washing away of sin"; on the other, the "death unto sin and new birth unto righteousness." As the service draws to its close, the later and deeper conception becomes dominant: a sentence from the prayer which follows the thanksgiving will serve to lead the way from the one Sacrament to the other, and to show their oneness of symbolism: "And humbly we beseech Thee to grant, that he, being dead unto sin, and living unto righteousness, and being buried with Christ in his death, may crucify the old man, and utterly abolish the whole body of sin; and that as he is made partaker of the death of Thy Son, he may also be partaker of His resurrection." Thus the mystical Death of Holy Baptism is the Door into the mystical Life with Christ in God.

II.—*Holy Communion.*—If Baptism, then, stands for such a Death and such a Rising again, how is the new life to be nourished? Might it not be expected that it will be through some relation to the same two central facts and factors of the Death and the Resurrection of Christ? In any case, our Lord instituted a second Sacrament in two kinds, the bread and the wine, the Body and the Blood. The explanation here suggested lies in the dual symbolism of the Bread and the Wine. Following upon the lines of the previous exposition, it is maintained that the two kinds correspond, like for like, with the dual action intended by the first rubric directing the method of baptizing—viz., by dipping the child underneath the water and bringing it up again, whether by single or by trine immersion. Comparing the two administrations, the delivery of the Bread would correspond to the immersion, and that of the Cup to the emersion.

As we have seen, the symbolism in Baptism represents the sharing, first in the Death, and then in the Resurrection, of our Lord. Do not the two kinds in the Holy Communion stand for the same dual idea and experience? Canon Sparrow Simpson would surely strengthen his claim for the communicating in both kinds if he carried his argument to this point. He comes very near to it, but does not quite reach it. He says: "The separateness of the two represents the idea of Death";* and later: ". . . the administration of the Sacrament to the communicant in both kinds has also its purposed symbolical meaning. For the Chalice represents Christ's Blood; and the Blood denotes the life. 'The blood is the life thereof.' So that communion in the Chalice symbolizes with peculiar vivid-

* THEOLOGY, December, 1921, p. 345.

ness the scriptural conception of the communication of life." He does not add, as he might according to the view of this paper: "The Bread represents Christ's Body; and the Body denotes the Death. The broken Bread stands for the Body slain. So that communion in the Bread symbolizes the scriptural conception of the sharing in the Death."

Here is where a synthesis with Dr. Kennett would be specially of value. His thesis is summed up in the words which he puts by a paraphrase into our Lord's lips, as saying to the disciples at the Last Supper: "You may regard Me as your Passover Lamb. We have agreed that this bread shall represent to us the Passover flesh, and this wine the Passover blood—that is, if I am the true Passover Lamb, My Flesh and My Blood" (p. 38). Into Professor Kennett's further application of the symbolism many may be unable to follow him; but if once we base our teaching, as he does, upon the relation between the Holy Communion and the Passover, we can then go on to study the dual symbolism of the Passover lamb, and we may find in it a very suggestive parallelism with the Christian Sacrament.

The flesh of the lamb after it was slain was eaten the same night by the members of each Hebrew family: the blood was sprinkled on the lintel and the door-posts. It is hardly to be supposed that they meditated upon the symbolism of the twofold action. Some, however, may have done so, then and later. To such the idea may have come: "The angel who passes over Egypt to-night will slay the firstborn in each Egyptian family; but when he sees the blood on our door, it will be a sign to him that a death has taken place in this house, that we are all symbolically sharers in that death by eating the flesh of the slain lamb, and that it is now for us a house of life, which death is not again to enter."

Notice, however, that though in both the Jewish and the Christian Passover the flesh was to be eaten, the application of the blood was different in the two cases. Mr. A. E. Baker points out most effectively the shock which would naturally stagger the minds of the disciples on being bidden to drink our Lord's Blood, for the Law had forbidden the drinking of blood. He does not endeavour to explain why that blood-tabu was then removed. Was not this the reason? If the blood of the lamb, or bull, or goat, was the symbol of its life—*i.e.*, of its nature—then human beings were naturally debarred from receiving into their lives the life of lower creatures. The blood of the lamb was therefore only sprinkled outside; but there it stood for a record of a covenant of blood, or covenant of life, between God and His people.*

* See *The Blood Covenant*, by H. Clay Trumbull, Philadelphia, 1893, *passim*.

When, however, the Lord Jesus instituted the central rite of His New Covenant, He bade His disciples to drink of the Cup as of " My Blood of the covenant " (St. Matthew, St. Mark, and St. Paul). Why, then, this abrogation of the law against the drinking of blood? Because it stood for the essential life of Incarnate God, and because the life of the Church and of each member of it was henceforth to be derived from and dependent continually upon the once offered, and from that time for ever proffered, life of the Crucified and Risen Christ. Thus the embargo was removed, and in the new rite the thing forbidden in the old became the thing commanded; for the thing signified thereby was not the life or nature of a lower animal, but was the very life and nature of the Highest. Thus the ideal of the drinking of the Cup was the strengthening and refreshing of the soul by a like experience, a renewed experience of what was formerly the ideal of the coming up out of the waters of Baptism. The humblest of believers, sharing by self-surrender and faith in the life of God in Christ, is in proportion to his faith made ever more and more deeply partaker of the Divine nature.

Nothing has been said of the significance of Confirmation regarded, as in Canon Mason's *The Relation of Confirmation to Holy Baptism*, as the second half or fulfilment of the initiatory rite. Obviously, it might be brought into the closest relation to the symbolism suggested in this paper. The words " I do" stand for a mystical death to the old life; the laying-on of hands for a mystical bestowal of the life of the Spirit.

Let it be enough here to sum up the stage reached in the present argument. It is not maintained that the view here set forth would be at once arrived at by the disciples in the Upper Room. The idea is quite different: it is that the meaning and method of the Holy Sacrament there ordained were so rich and full that it would necessarily be left to the Church of the future to work out by degrees ever fuller meanings. Still, it is maintained that the idea of the balance of death and life suggested by the Body and the Blood would be one traditionally understanded of the people of the Jews, and naturally capable of being worked out in the thought of the Church.

Into the question of the relation between St. Paul's conception and the implications of the Mystery Religions it is not intended here to enter.* Let it only be said that if the present thesis can be made good, that the rhythm of death and life in the Holy Communion was rooted in the Hebrew thought and cultus, so much the better if it can also be shown that such

* See H. A. A. Kennedy, *St. Paul and the Mystery Religions*, and the essay by Dean Inge in the Oxford symposium, *The Legacy of Greece*.

a balance was at the heart of Greek or Oriental religious systems current at the time in the lands around the Mediterranean, where Christianity at first spread. This would make the implication of the new Rite comprehensible to Gentile as well as to Jew. To both alike it would suggest that the communion of the Body of Christ was a common sharing in His death, and the communion of the Blood of Christ was a common sharing in His life. Thus once again the often-repeated partaking of the broken Bread would be a door of mystical Death to deeper elements of the self-life, and the partaking of the Cup would be the mystical entering upon fresh realizations of the power of the Christ-life.

III.—*Synthesis.*—The Editor of THEOLOGY rejoices that "men seek for synthesis rather than for victory." The object of this paper is to seize the present moment for expressing "the idea of the Eucharist" in a view which might possibly afford some basis for a synthesis between what are known, for want of better terms, as the Anglican and the Evangelical views. The view suggested here might perhaps synthetically be called "Evanglican."

Is it not true, then, that the Evangelical view has tended to emphasize the Death-element in the Sacrament, and the Anglican the Life-element?

1. The Evangelical—may one say characteristically?—has followed the Catechism. It has often been regarded as unfortunate that the questions and answers upon the two Sacraments do not run upon the same lines. Briefly put, the "inward and spiritual grace" in Baptism, in its double action, is magnificently defined. It is "a death unto sin and a new birth unto righteousness." On the other hand, the purpose of the double action in the Lord's Supper is defined in a way inadequate and one-sided. It was ordained "For the continual remembrance of the sacrifice of the death of Christ, and of the benefits which we receive thereby." Here no reference is made to the benefits of the Resurrection of Christ. Would it not have been more consistent to have said, "For the continual remembrance of the sacrifice of the death of Christ and of the power of His risen life"? This tradition from the Reformation has profoundly influenced the practical theology of the Evangelical Movement. The emphasis in the teaching on the Holy Communion was connected with the doctrine of Justification by Faith. Candidates for Confirmation were taught to think at the Holy Table of Christ *for* us, far more than of Christ *in* us. The offer of pardon counted for more

than the offer of life-power. There was more of death unto sin than of life unto God. To sum it up crudely in the terms of this paper, the significance of the Bread was grandly brought out, but that of the Cup did not add anything to it: the Blood stood for death, as did the Body.

2. The Oxford Movement, on the other hand, shifted the emphasis from the Death side to the Life side. It taught an exactly opposite meaning for the Bread. Anglo-Catholic teaching centres attention on the "glorified Body"—that is to say, the Body in its present condition after the mysterious change of the Resurrection, and regarded as involving and conveying with it the whole complex Personality of the Risen Lord, both God and man. Is not this to run the opposite danger of minimizing the centrality of the Cross, and to read into the first element of the Sacrament the symbolism which properly attaches to the second? Was it not His Body as sacrificed that our Saviour bade His disciples to partake of, to have communion with? Then, passing through that grave and gate of death, they were to enter with all possible fullness into communion with the eternal principle of His immortal life, of His essential being.

3. It is not here suggested that either of the two historic schools ignores either the element of life or death in the Eucharist, but only that each would find a fuller Gospel there, if it were recognized that there is an intended and essential duality in the symbolism of the Sacrament, and would give to each its due value. In this connexion it may not be out of place to refer to the original teaching of the less known but widely influential Spiritual Movement, that connected with the Keswick Convention. It is true that sacramental teaching has never formed a part of the official utterances at those great gatherings; their interdenominational basis has stood in the way. However, the vast assemblies at the Holy Communion of the closing Sunday, year by year, have always seemed the most natural and inevitable crown and seal upon the teachings and experiences of the previous week. For what was the root-cause and final purpose at the back of that Movement? It was the reaction against the one-sidedness and lack of proportion referred to in paragraph 1. The founders and earliest teachers in these mid-seventies had long known the power of the doctrine of "Christ for us" to release from the burden of guilt. Recently they had heard preached with a new force and emphasis the complementary doctrine of "Christ in us"; and the message had come to them with a power that had lit up their lives. To use the language of the New Psychology to describe events of nearly fifty years ago, it was "suggested" to them that they

had died with Christ, and been buried with Him: that they had also with Him risen to a new life, a resurrection life, freed from the power of sin and temptation, filled with the power of an endless life. They took the suggestion. They acted upon it. They reckoned themselves dead to sin and alive unto God. And according to their faith it was done unto them; the men and women of deepest faith displayed lives of apostolic and infectious holiness.

There was nothing really new about the teaching. It was as old as the sixth chapter of Romans and the second chapter of Galatians. It had been implicit in the Church ever since; and the Mystics had guarded it, and from time to time brought it out to light after periods when it had been forgotten None the less, just then it needed to be made explicit, and who will say that the Church does not need it to-day ?

4. Let, then, such a theology and such a psychology be linked with the Holy Communion, and you get an answer to the question proposed, " In what sense and in what way ' the strengthening and refreshing of our souls ' can be brought about ' by the Body and Blood of Christ ' ? " Would that Miss Evelyn Underhill had used her dramatic sense and literary power to do for the English Rite what she has done so movingly for the Mass ! Failing that—or awaiting it—let an attempt at least be made to answer the question by the help of two moments in the Order of the Holy Communion which should be full of dramatic meaning.

(1) After the Offertory comes the rubric: " And when there is a Communion, the priest shall then place upon the Table so much Bread and Wine, as he shall think sufficient." Picture, then, a great crowd of worshippers in some cathedral or great city church, or a little handful in some country village. They " mind to come to the Holy Communion of the Body and Blood of our Saviour Christ." Alike in body and in soul they feel weakened and wearied with the storm and stress of their lives, with the temptations and the burdens of the way. They need strengthening and refreshing for the onward way. And as the priest places upon the Table the bread, might not they and he seize that moment for a great use ? " Take, Lord, this is my body: these are our bodies. They are no longer ours, but Thine. Make them truly Thine, to serve the Father as Thy Body on earth did: to serve our fellow-men as Thine did: to die with Thee." Then, at the placing of the wine: " Take, Lord, this is my soul: these are our souls. Here is the living principle of our being. Thou hast said, Abide in ME ! We would let our lives go into Thy life, that it may no longer be we that live, but Thou that livest in us." In some

such way may the weary and heavy-laden bring the burden of their bodies and souls to the Cross, trusting in the sure promise of Him who said, "He that loseth his life for My sake shall find it."

(2) Thence, if the expression may be allowed with all due reverence, the holy Drama moves forward, through all-embracing Intercession to Royal Invitation, through Confession to Absolution, through Comfortable Words to responsive Praise and Thanks, through Humble Access to the Act of Consecration. And here there is a fresh "ordering" by the priest of the Bread and Wine. They are to be turned to a new use. There is to be a reciprocity, a mutuality, between the Communicator and the communicant. Now in His turn He takes the Bread; He gives it back to those who had given it to Him, but with a new meaning. They gave it to Him for their body, that in it He might share their death. He gives it to them as His Body, that in His death they might die.

Again, He takes the Wine, and gives it back to those who had given it to Him. He in His Incarnation had linked His life with theirs, that in His Resurrection their life might be linked with His.

In some such rhythm of death and life the Service reaches its climax. Soul, and with it body, are fed unto everlasting life. The whole man is strengthened and refreshed.

Through such a dual idea of the Eucharist the antinomies of death and life are resolved. They combine in one inspiring symbolism. He who would die to sin and live to God finds here the gate of death that leads to life.

If this idea is the true one, then all life is linked together in a mystic way. From the first descent to death and ascent to life at the font, through each going down to deeper death and coming up to fuller life in the Holy Communion, the Christian looks on to that glorious day when, coming to Death's Door itself, he trusts to have fulfilled to him the Easter Even prayer "that through the grave, and gate of death, we may pass to our joyful resurrection."

DUNDAS HARFORD.

SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY

HALF a century ago, when the unprofitable controversy between religion and science was raging, Professor J. W. Draper entered the field with his *Conflict between Religion and Science*, in which he made one of the bitterest attacks ever made on the Christian Faith. In this book the author showed his utter inability to appreciate spiritual values; but to-day hardly anyone reads it, for it represents a position long since abandoned

by scientist and theologian alike. The old battle has spent its force, and there is scarcely a man of science who would be prepared to reopen the struggle. It has now become apparent that the scientist and the theologian deal with different aspects of truth, the one being concerned with facts and the other with values. Science is empirical in method; theology rests its claims on an appeal to the supersensuous, to a higher order of reality than is reached in sense-experience. The primary aim of science is " the classification of facts and the formation of absolute judgments upon the basis of this classification ";* the description of the impersonal facts of experience in verifiable terms as complete and precise as possible. Being thus a system of knowledge gained by observation (according to some, including introspection) and by experiment, it answers the question *how* rather than *why*. The law of gravitation, for instance, is a brief description of *how* every particle of matter in the universe is altering its motion with reference to every other particle. It does not tell us *why* particles move in this manner, it does not tell us *why* the earth describes a certain curve round the sun. It simply describes, without explaining, the routine of our perceptions, which forms for us the universe of gravitating matter. A range of facts is studied, classified, and analyzed in the hope of discovering relationships and sequences, and the widest possible range of phenomena. The points of likeness and difference displayed by this or that historical series are noted, with the object of determining general laws of normal sequence or tendency, and of distinguishing in a given series of events or reactions the essential elements while discarding those which are irrelevant. In the case of the exact sciences such as gravitational astronomy, chemistry, and physics, the registration of the material can be made with extraordinary precision. Measurements can be taken with absolute accuracy, or analyses carried out with approximate completeness. In the scientific investigation of human institutions, beliefs, customs, etc., this precise registration is more difficult, analysis is very imperfect, formulation is only provisional, and prediction is in most cases hazardous. In the domain of psychology, anthropology, etc., test experiments similar to those employed in chemical or physical research are often impossible. Nevertheless, every aspect of life, every past or present phenomenon (communicable and verifiable), which is reached by medical observation and experiment and admits of concise and connected formulation, can be treated scientifically, though the methods of verification may be easier in some domains than in others. As Karl Pearson has said, " It is not facts themselves which make science, but

* Karl Pearson, *The Grammar of Science* (London, 1911), p. 6.

the method by which they are dealt with. The material of science is coextensive with the whole universe, not only that universe as it now exists, but with its past history and the past history of all life therein."*

Science, therefore, claims the whole universe as its field, and its material is coextensive with the whole life of the universe, physical and mental. But it makes no attempt to reach complete knowledge in every department. Certain domains of research are manifestly outside its scope. It is not the function of science to get behind description to supply explanation, to refer facts of experience to any ultimate reality. It is not concerned with values, and the scientist, when he knows his province and its limitations, leaves to the philosopher and the theologian the task of interpreting the facts of human history and of the material world in terms of validity or worth. It is, therefore, the business of the philosopher-theologian, who looks at the whole as a whole, to supplement the *how* of science with a *why* by subordinating cause for purpose, to determine how facts and values may be correlated, and may both together be conceived in terms of law as applicable to a world in evolution.†

So far, then, from science and philosophy or theology being contradictory, they really are (or should be) complementary. They are concerned, it is true, with different methods and aims, but as Professor A. E. Taylor has pointed out, " the work of the Philosophy of Nature and of Mind only begins where that of experimental science leaves off. Its data are not particular facts, as directly amassed by experiment and observation, but the hypotheses used by experimental science for the co-ordination and description of those facts. And it examines these hypotheses, not with the object of modifying their structure so as to include new facts, or to include the old facts in a simpler form, but purely for the purpose of estimating their value as an account of ultimately real existence. Whether the hypotheses are adequate as implements for the calculation of natural processes is a question which philosophy, when it understands its place, leaves entirely to the special sciences. Whether they can claim to be more than useful formulæ for calculation—*i.e.*, whether they can give us knowledge of ultimate reality—is a problem which can only be dealt with by the science which systematically analyses the meaning of reality—*i.e.*, by metaphysics. We may perhaps follow the usage of some recent writers in marking this difference of object by a difference in terminology, and say that the goal of experimental science is the description of facts, the goal of metaphysics their inter-

* *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

† *Cf.* R. R. Marett, *American Journal of Theology*, October, 1916, p. 524, and *Psychology and Folk-lore* (London, 1921), p. 153 *f.*

pretation. The difference of aim is, however, not ultimate. Description of facts, when once we cease to be content with such description as will subserve the purpose of calculation and call for description of the fact as it really is, of itself becomes metaphysical interpretation."*

Truth is many-sided, and the search after truth, which is the aim alike of the scientist, the philosopher, and the true theologian, must have many different aspects. The majority of people refuse to be satisfied with the systematic descriptions which science supplies; they want to have a wider and more comprehensive view of the whole scheme of things to which they belong. They are anxious to see the whole construction and not just the raw material, and therefore they are apt to incline to the philosophers—the architects—who review the whole as a whole in contradistinction to the scientists, who concentrate on the several parts. While without the raw material the edifice could not be built, an architectural genius is also essential in order that the various parts may be " fitly framed together." It is because we are bound to take in the parts as parts of a whole that philosophy is not only possible but inevitable.

Now, what applies to philosophy is in a measure true also of theology. Theology is at once the science and the philosophy of religion. Religion in its simpler forms cannot be designated theology, since to people in a primitive state of culture the former is not a matter of theory but of practice. The primitive mind is incapable of grasping abstract thought to any appreciable extent, just as it is unable to assimilate complex ideas. It cannot separate or analyze out particular elements from the whole. Ritual, therefore, is more complex than belief, and although to the cultured mind many underlying conceptions may be suggested by a long and complicated rite, to the savage it appears as the " outward and visible sign " of but one inward meaning. To him the rite as a whole is felt to be in some mystic way effective in bringing about the desired result. And since he views all the agents, elements, and accessories of the rite as devoid of separate individuality—common actors in a sacred drama fused and interchanging in a manner unintelligible to civilized thought—to him the rite becomes but one massive apprehension. The chief value, therefore, belongs to the rite itself and not to the various beliefs connected with it. Primitive man, as Dr. Marett has truly said, " dances out his religion." A ritualist he is, a theologian he is not. The notion of the primitive philosopher communing alone with nature, evolving cosmological ideas out of his inner consciousness, has to be seriously modified when savage mythology is considered

* *Elements of Metaphysics* (London, 1909), p. 192.

in relation to ritual acts. Tylor is probably correct in maintaining that man's craving to know the reason why is "among rude savages an intellectual appetite,"* but, nevertheless, since primitive man is essentially a man of action, he usually acts before he thinks. Moreover, he does not find it easy to express his thoughts in words, and so he resorts to visual language. He thinks with his eyes rather than by articulate sounds, and he translates these thoughts into representative actions. When he wants a good harvest, he does not keep rogation days with greater zeal, but gathers together certain members of his tribe and holds what in Central Australia is called an *Intichiuma* ceremony, in the hope that he will make the plants and animals by which he lives multiply, or that refreshing showers may fall on the kindly fruits of the earth.† Ritual is therefore the outward expression of thought, and at the same time a vent of pent-up emotions and activity.‡ Such a stage of ritual is probably more primitive and "natural" than ideas concerning the *how* and *why* of what is done.

In process of time, however, some mysterious authority is needed to account for time-honoured conventions and rigidly observed rites. It is then that the primitive philosopher-theologian begins to set forth the theory of a golden age, in which powerful ancestral spirits or high gods roamed on the earth, framed the laws, taught men the arts of life and the ritual practices to be observed, and having accomplished their task, returned to their abode in the skies. Thus mythology—the primitive attempt at theology—represents the expression of the desire to supply logical certainties, so that the practical certainties which religion needs may rest on firm foundations. The duly established ritual and social customs having become invested with a supernatural sanction are likely to become permanent, unless a leader arises who can break through the established order by showing a new and better way, or, as is more usual, belief comes to play a more important part in religion through the development of the mind, with the result that the primitive notions are systematized, moralized, and expanded. Deities are assigned special functions, the hierarchy of heaven is regulated, and the gods regarded as the rewarders of virtue and punishers of vice, to whom man in times of extremity can turn with the cry, "Save me, O God, for the waters are come in unto my soul."§

The human mind is a complex organ, and we are now begin-

* *Primitive Culture* (London, 1903), i., p. 369.

† *Cf.* the Author's article "Rain" in Hastings' *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics.*

‡ Marett, *Threshold of Religion* (London, 1914), pp. 44 *f.*; *cf.* J. E. Harrison, *Ancient Art and Ritual* (London, 1913), p. 34.

§ *Cf.* E. O. James, *Primitive Ritual and Belief* (London, 1917), p. 217.

ning to understand that there are two types of thinking. The first, which Jung calls "directed thinking,"* "imitates reality and seeks to act upon it." It is concerned with "the classification of facts and the formation of absolute judgments upon the basis of this classification," and is therefore the sort of thinking employed in all scientific research. But this is probably of comparatively late development, and is not found among primitive people. A second and earlier type of thought, called "dream" or "phantasy-thinking," is inclined more towards subjective impulses and wish fulfilment than to reality.† Hence it is productive of dreams and of myths to explain the inexplicable. Primitive theology belongs to this attitude of mind, and acts as a valve of pent-up emotion, thereby preventing the dangers arising from "suppressed complexes." But it has left behind it a very considerable residue, which has to be cleared away before "directed thinking" can have full scope. The conflict between theology and science to a very considerable degree represents this process.

To some extent, but happily to a continuously decreasing extent, the results of science are found to be inconsistent with religious beliefs, and a heated controversy may ensue. This discrepancy is generally due either to the primitive type of thought conflicting with the later "directed thinking," or to the workers in the one sphere failing to keep within the proper limits of their domain, as in the case of the attitude of the Church towards Galileo's astronomical investigations. Theology, in this instance, made itself ridiculous by passing judgment upon matters entirely outside its province, and its action was as unjustifiable as if the British Association were to promulgate a decree against the Virgin Birth or Resurrection of Our Lord. On the other hand, old beliefs die hard. It is not easy for people brought up in earlier modes of thought to realize that matters discoverable by human reason and the means which God has placed within the reach of man's faculties are not the proper subjects of Divine revelation, any more than the material facts of nature are the concern of revealed religion. But until this is accomplished there is bound to be some conflict between theology and science.

It was not until long after the theory of evolution had become established as a scientific hypothesis that theologians abandoned the dogma of special creation, notwithstanding the repeated assertion of scientists that "the theory of evolution is quite compatible with the belief in a God,"‡ and "does not

* *Psychology of the Unconscious*, English trans. (London, 1921), p. 11.

† W. H. R. Rivers, "Dreams and Primitive Culture" in *Bulletin of John Rylands Library, Manchester*, vol. iv., 3 and 4, p. 387.

‡ Darwin, *Life and Letters* (London, 1887), i., p. 307.

profess to solve the ultimate mystery of this universe."* As Huxley truly said, "Evolution does not come into contact with Theism, considered as a philosophical doctrine. That with which it does collide, and with which it is absolutely inconsistent, is the conception of creation which theological speculators have based upon the history narrated in the opening of the Book of Genesis."† Theology can never be too grateful for the researches of such men as the late Canon Driver, showing the true nature, and at the same time the true value, of the mythological element in the literature of the Old Testament. Much still remains to be done before the proper relationship is established between scientific formulation and theological interpretation, but the outlook is hopeful since both scientists and theologians are coming to recognize that they have a common aim—the establishment of truth for truth's sake. Thus Dr. Marett, in treating of origin and validity in religion, has been led to say, "There is at least one prejudice that the theologian and the anthropologist have in common, and that is the love of truth. The very nerve of science consists in the will to believe only the truth. Religion, too, is surely bound to regard this as the only genuine will to believe."‡

While the question of absolute origin belongs to theology, the study of the material universe certainly lies within the domain of scientific observation. Thus, if the scientist leaves the matter of primary causes to the theologian, he is perfectly right in arriving at his own conclusions by his own methods with regard to secondary causes. Take, for instance, the vexed question of the origin of life. Supposing further research in the synthesis of complex organic compounds results in the synthetic production of the living cell,§ the scientist would not claim to have solved the mystery of life. All that he would claim would be an increased knowledge of the chemical reactions constituting the phenomena of life, and if the organic could be shown to have arisen from inorganic matter the whole world would become more continuous and vital. But with the interpretation of life in terms of creative evolution, mind, and spirit, he may reasonably be allowed—speaking as a scientist—to adopt an agnostic position. Nevertheless, there would be nothing in the scientific evidence to prevent the philosopher and theologian interpreting the facts in terms of a higher order of reality. Bergson would still be at liberty to say, "I see in the whole evolution of life on our planet a crossing of matter by creative consciousness, an effort to set free by force of ingenuity and invention something which in the animal still

* Tyndall, *The Scientific Use of the Imagination* (London, 1872), p. 49.
† *British Assoc. Report*, Dublin, 1878, p. 575.
‡ *American Journal of Theology*, October, 1916, p. 518.
§ The chemical composition of the nucleus of the cell has already been determined.

remains imprisoned, and is only finally released when we reach man."* And in coming to this conclusion he would probably be not far from the truth.

There is, however, an attitude of mind that is gaining favour in certain intellectual circles at the present time, in which the theologian cannot acquiesce without undermining the basis upon which historic Christianity stands. This new religion, "the higher pantheism," substitutes values for truth, and seeks to retain spiritual qualities, while rejecting the realities from which they spring. The external Creator, Father and Saviour, has become "the undying human memory, the increasing human will"†—in short, the Immanent God is nothing but the mystery of the whole of things, and the function of modern religion is the realization of self within the limits of the community. It is values, not facts, that constitute the modernist Gospel. "For the new Immanentist creeds have become all but insignificant; they are to him, not living expressions of truth apprehended, but barriers, dams artificially built to stem the inrush of living waters. The whole centre of gravity has shifted from authority to experience."‡ In other words, religion is simply an activity of the human as opposed to the Divine Spirit, unrelated to any transcendent reality, and entirely dissociated from the quest of truth.

If this were actually the case, there would indeed be a conflict between science and religion, since their aims as well as their spheres of action would have nothing in common. Moreover, it is inconceivable that reasonable beings will be induced to fashion their lives according to the dictates of a fictitious system founded upon assumptions which can lay no claim to historical truth or ultimate reality. No; the Church may—and in our opinion ought to—revise, as in times past, its modes of interpretation of the Scriptures:§ "to find allegory where before it found history, development where before there seemed finality, symbolism where once the letter had seemed to suffice"; but, as Mr. Selwyn has recently pointed out, the Catholic creeds "represent original revelation given through history, recorded in Scripture, and ever more fully apprehended in the experience of the Church."‖ If they are set aside

* *Mind Energy* (English translation), Wildon Carr (London, 1920), p. 18; *cf.* p. 25.

† J. E. Harrison, *Rationalism and Reaction* (London, 1919), p. 19.

‡ J. E. Harrison, *Epilegomena to the Study of Greek Religion* (Cambridge, 1921), p. 36.

§ Theology has always readjusted itself to religion as the latter has developed. Thus St. Paul and St. John re-stated the Christology of the Church of Jerusalem, and their disciples translated Judaic Christianity into Hellenic. The Fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries adjusted the old truths to the categories of their age (*cf.* Nicene and Athanasian Creeds), just as the scholastics in the Middle Ages re-shaped tradition in terms of Aristotle.

‖ *Theology* (November, 1921), p. 262.

as statements of fact the whole fabric of historic Christianity falls to the ground. It may be true that "none of the creeds express the convictions of the modern mind on the fundamental principles of Christianity,"* but they unquestionably express the mind of the Church of the third and fourth centuries. True, "every creed of value must leave elbow-room for modern thought," and "the Church must absorb science and not nibble at it"; but at the same time there must be some room left for the exercise of faith which is of the very essence of Christianity —"by faith we stand." To the orthodox theologian religion —and particularly the Christian religion—is not merely a human impulse, an undirected search after the supernatural. Rather is it the result of the operation of the Holy Spirit in the human reason leading and guiding it into all truth. We find this Divine energy of the Spirit of God at work in the mind of man in all ages—in the progressive revelation set forth in the legends, myths, and rites of the pre-Christian era preparing the way for the supreme revelation in Christ, the Word made flesh. But it does not stop with the Incarnation. St. Mark, St. Luke, St. Paul, St. Matthew, and St. John brought forth the fruits of the Spirit. The Church regards these as the true products of the Spirit of God, and therefore as inspired and authoritative tradition setting forth definite beliefs without which faith cannot be. Faith is the fundamental aspect of Christianity, because it is the condition of the reception of the Divine life of the Spirit. It was the gift of the Spirit that revealed to the followers of our Lord His true character, and the significance of the work done by Him on Good Friday and Easter Day. These are matters quite outside the sphere of scientific observation, and therefore in "absorbing science" the great doctrines of the Faith—the Incarnation, Atonement, Resurrection, and the gift of the Spirit—remain unaltered. The scientist may be able to show us parallels to these beliefs in other religions, but this neither proves nor disproves the theological issue. Thus, as regards the Virgin Birth, those who depend entirely upon documentary evidence generally find it insufficient to substantiate the hypothesis. But, as Huxley was prepared to admit, granting the fact of the Incarnation it is difficult to imagine how the birth of the really sinless man could have occurred without some physical miracle.† It is not surprising that those who deny the miraculous conception of our Lord usually end by discrediting His divinity, so closely related are the doctrines of the Virgin Birth and the Incarnation.

* D. White, *The Modern Churchman* (September, 1921), p. 338.

† C. Gore, *Belief in God* (London, 1921), p. 281. But, as Gore points out, the Roman Church has certainly not strengthened the case by the promulgation of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin.

The historical evidence for the Resurrection and the subsequent appearances to the Apostles is exceptionally convincing, and, except on the assumption that miracles are incredible, it is not easy to resist it.

Once these foundations of Christianity are established, the rest follows; but until theologians validate them in terms of reality, the Christian Faith and Christian morality are in jeopardy. The modernist solution contributes nothing towards the harmonization of scientific research and *historic* Christianity, inasmuch as it rejects the religion of the Gospels and the Councils, and tends to reduce Christianity to what is to all intents and purposes merely Immanentism. Moreover, when it substitutes values for reality it denies the first principle of scientific investigation. To the scientist there can be no true values apart from reality, and surely the same holds for theology. If our foundations will not bear the test of impartial enquiry in the light of modern knowledge, then we cannot claim to hold and teach the truth, and the sooner we give up a system based on "phantasy-thinking" the better. The spirit of free enquiry is abroad, and it is quite useless for theology to ascribe its formularies to the authority of an infallible Church, or rest them on "an impregnable rock of Holy Scripture," till it has validated its claim. That a reconstruction of belief is necessary in view of the progress of scientific research few acquainted with the facts will deny, and it is indeed a hopeful sign that so eminent and orthodox a theologian as Dr. Gore has attempted this task, and with no small success.*

In *Belief in God* this distinguished scholar makes his appeal to "men and women of ordinary intelligence and education, discarding prejudices and arming themselves with nothing but the resolute determination to know and follow the truth, to begin at the beginning, and seek to build the fabric of a belief which they can feel in their conscience to be reasonable and convincing." He realizes the delusion of the "pragmatist argument"—that it is only moral values that matter—because he sees the moral cannot be separated from the intellectual and metaphysical question. A belief, that is, which is necessary for a good life must be true, and of such a nature that it can be taken as a proposition for the intellect, a proposition dealing with reality, like the propositions we frame about nature, of course with due regard to their limits in each particular case. The postulates must be historically and scientifically true, so far as this is possible in the nature of the evidence. Theology, like science, must belong to the world of objective reality, if religious experience derived therefrom is to be the experience of reality.

E. O. James.

* *Belief in God* (London, 1921).

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Fr. Trenholme's short article on the Revision of the Liturgy is timely and will appeal to all who desire a return to ordered and agreed ways in the Celebration of the Eucharist. Of the reality of that desire, the number of independent and voluntary efforts to bring about agreement among groups of the clergy themselves is sufficient testimony. But the abortiveness of those efforts is also an indication that, if unity of rite is to be secured, the Church as a whole, acting through its proper authorities, must order it. We believe we are right in saying that the "Canterbury Canon," as the 1918 proposals came to be called, was only blocked by the action of a minority of bishops in the Northern Province. Until such obstructive methods are abandoned, no progress can be made.

The Convocations, and particularly their Upper Houses, must decide whether they really wish to have a revised Canon which is likely to be accepted by the Catholic movement as a whole. It is an opportunity which may not recur. The fact that the revised Prayer Book is to be optional makes it more than ever vital that the good-will of the Catholic-minded clergy should be secured, for otherwise we shall only have one more rite added to those which are already in use. The most recent proposals of Convocation for the revision of the Canon will please none but a few pedants; and it is as well that the fact should be realized. On the other hand, the very simple and moderate changes advocated by Fr. Trenholme would have every chance of serving as a rallying-ground for public opinion among those clergy who have shown themselves most dissatisfied with the defects of our present Canon.

TWO NOTES

I.

In the April number of Theology, p. 199, the "Anima Christi" is attributed to S. Ignatius Loyola, who was born in 1491.

In addition to the MSS. quoted in the *Dictionary of Hymnology*, p. 1605, I believe it occurs in *Harl.* 2253, dated about 1321.

In vol. iv. of Baümker's *Das katholische deutsche Kirchenlied*, p. 461, the following quotation is given from the *Continuatio Tornacensis Sigeberti* (Monumenta Germaniae historica, Script. T. vi., p. 444), under the year 1334:

> "Obiit dominus Johannes divina providencia Papa XXII. . . . Composuit quandam orationem que est anima Christi. Quam qui in missa dixerit, 30 dies indulgenciae obtinebit, scil 20 pro peccatis mortalibus et 10 pro venialibus."

According to the *Dictionary of Hymnology*, p. 1605, a similar note as regards Pope John XXII. granting an indulgence appears in *Harl.* 1260, f. 158 (*c.* 1370), but apparently nothing is said about the authorship.

II.

In the C.S.S.S. Leaflet 45 (January, 1911) a list of references is given for the familiar classification, "the world, the flesh, and the devil." To the passages there quoted may be added the following, from hymns in the Aberdeen Breviary:

(*a*) From "O celi sydus lucide" (S. Maurice)—

"Tu preces nostras suscipe:
Et nos pat*er* piissime:
A trina morte protege:
Mundi carnis *et* sathane."

(*b*) From "Adest dies leticie" (S. Ninian)—

"Iesu rector luctan*cium*:
Tua nos rege gra*cia*:
Supplan*tando* demoni*um*:
Mundum carne*m* iusticia."

M. Frost.

IN THE STUDY

By Rev. W. K. Lowther Clarke, B.D., Edit. Sec. of S.P.C.K.

ADVICE ON BOOKS

If readers who require advice on courses of theological study or the choice of books care to write to the Editorial Department of S.P.C.K., an attempt will be made to give them the required information. Sixpence in stamps should be sent to cover the cost of the necessary correspondence. It will frequently be necessary to refer the enquiry to an expert; a number of well-known scholars have consented to help in this way. Sometimes, especially in the summer months, there may be a little delay in answering. The Editor reserves the right to publish answers if they are of sufficient general interest. In such cases the initials of the correspondents will be given.

X.—FOREIGN THEOLOGY

Professor Eduard Meyer of Berlin occupies in the study of classical antiquity a place not unlike that of Mommsen a generation ago. He has lately turned his attention to the New Testament, and two out of three projected volumes on the Beginnings of Christianity have already appeared. The books are brilliant and suggestive, though, as might be expected in one writing outside his own special field of knowledge, not devoid of mistakes. The passage to which I call attention is in the Preface, which is addressed to a fellow-professor. He recalls how they visited the Baltic States in the inspiring days of the spring of 1918. *They trusted that these lands were permanently freed from the foreign yoke*, but, alas! their hopes were disappointed. It will be recalled that German armies occupied these countries—now Lithuania, Latvia, and Esthonia—for a while after the collapse of Russia. The professor judges that for this brief period only they were free. But the Germans have never been more than a small minority of the population, though owing to their

position as landowners their influence was out of proportion to their numbers. The population as a whole was neither German nor Russian, but Lithuanian, Lett, and Esth. The actual proportions are given in works of reference.

It appears, then, that great erudition is no security that a man's judgment upon contemporary historical problems will not be completely perverted by national prejudice. But past history is so bound up with the present day that a purely objective treatment of the past is almost impossible of attainment. In the hands of some investigators the Reformation becomes an economic rather than a religious movement: others use the Middle Ages to inculcate gild-socialism. History differs from natural science because it is the judgment of fallible human minds upon past events which cannot be reproduced, whereas in the physical sciences experiments are repeated in the laboratory until certainty is reached. The nationality of the scholar hardly counts in chemistry: in history it is important. We do well to criticize the German professor, but it would be wiser to ask what are the natural prepossessions of English historians which hinder them from seeing the truth?

Such considerations apply to theology even more than to history. The issues at stake are so vital that it is impossible to approach fundamental theological problems with complete objectivity. The best we can do is to study them honestly with every available faculty, and check our results with those of investigators who approach the problems with equal honesty but different mental prepossessions. This is a further reason, to be added to the reasons given in the April number of THEOLOGY, for studying foreign books. We have reason to believe that the totality of scholars who are disciples of Christ will eventually be led into all the truth which is possible under earthly conditions, but no grounds for supposing that the scholars of one nation working in isolation can claim the promise.

A hint dropped above may be profitably developed. A certain measure of verification of results *is* possible in theology. Experiments can be reproduced in the laboratory of the Church's pastoral work. Attempts to explain the origins of Christianity on purely academic and literary lines are doomed to failure. The more we know of the work of the Holy Spirit in our own hearts and in the lives of others to-day, the better fitted are we to understand the Acts of the Apostles, the Gospel of the Holy Spirit, as it has been called. A purely literary critic may find in the Mystery Religions the key to St. Paul. A critic with an experimental knowledge of prayer will recognize that the Apostle was primarily a man of prayer, and the mysteries will become a side-issue of little importance. Undue specialization, always dangerous, is fatal in theology, and the literary criticism of the scholar needs to be tempered by the devotion of the humble Christian and the practical experience of the pastor, and this in the same person. The sanity of British theological scholarship is due to the combination of academic and pastoral pursuits in its leading representatives, and it would be disastrous if any but a small proportion of professed theologians were outside the ministry of the Church.

REVIEW

THE DOCTRINE OF SIN: A CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE VIEWS OF THE CONCEPT OF SIN HELD IN EARLY CHRISTIAN, MEDIÆVAL, AND MODERN TIMES. By Reginald Stewart Moxon, B.D., Headmaster of Lincoln School, formerly Scholar of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 1922. Pp. 251. 10s. 6d. net.

ALMOST everything, in this question of sin, turns on what one makes of Augustine. Not, of course, in the way of intellectual agreement from point to point. That is impossible, for the weak points in Augustinianism as a system are patent, and it is strange that the person mainly concerned should not have realized that bad defences are worse than none at all when an acute enemy is looking for an opening. But the result of his labours in the Pelagian controversy is not to be judged by any reckonings as to the quantitative adequacy of his dogmatic. Acknowledging that in a unique manner he has impressed himself, not only upon Christian thought, but more deeply upon Christian feeling and Christian spiritual sensitiveness in respect of sin, one asks, "Has he done this for the Church's good, or has he been the great mis-leader?" At the last one must side either with Harnack, who had drastic enough criticism to make and yet was profoundly impressed with the greatness of Augustine's work as "Reformer of Christian Piety," or with Dr. Thomas Allin, whose attack on the great African Father in *The Augustinian Revolution in Theology* was the more forcible because of the passion for the goodness and love of God which fired his pen. The Pelagian controversy belongs in its form to the age in which it arose; but the issues which it raised belong, like human nature itself, to every age; wherever a religious interpretation of sin, grace, freewill, even predestination, is sought, men will separate from one another after the fashion of Augustine and Pelagius.

So it is inevitable that Mr. Moxon should have much to say about the Pelagian controversy in all its bearings and results. Even though he believes that he can find a clue to the meaning of sin, and a definition of original sin, along lines suggested by modern physical and psychological science, and remote in many respects from the assumptions common to both Augustine and Pelagius, as well as from the points in which they differed, he has been well advised to go over the old ground again and to explore it in detail. That it was "perhaps the most interesting and important controversy which the Christian

world had yet witnessed" seems to me, even with the initial qualifying word, a curious exaggeration in view of the great struggle against Arianism in the fourth century; but a controversy which concerned itself so intimately with the character of the relationship between man and God and involved the question of the true nature of religion as a moral and spiritual activity of the soul, and engaged as one of its protagonists a man whose personal greatness is hardly to be disputed, has still much to teach us.

The groundwork of the book is historical narrative with accompanying discussion. We pass from a survey of Eastern and Western views during the early centuries of the Christian era to a description of the Pelagian controversy. A full account, critical and appreciative, is given of the teaching, first of Pelagius, then of Augustine. To these chapters succeeds one on Semipelagianism, the writing of which may have given Mr. Moxon more satisfaction than anything else in the volume. The most important developments in the doctrine of sin during mediæval and Reformation times are next reviewed, after which a valuable chapter puts the reader in touch with modern writers, not all professed theologians, in whose theories the influence of metaphysical speculation and of the method of natural science is observable. Finally, researches in psychology, especially in connexion with the subconscious and with the power and possible sublimation of natural instincts, are drawn upon with a view to the construction of new concepts of sin, both original and actual. The former is tentatively defined as "*the universal tendency in man, inherited by him from his animal ancestors, to gratify the natural instincts and passions and to use them for selfish ends*"; the latter as "*selfishness resulting from over-individualized personality.*"

Of this constructive climax, with its roots in psychological investigations, it is hard not to believe that, whatever its suggestiveness and apparent timeliness, in view of the widespread interest in problems concerning the nature of personality, we are a long way from such a settled position in these matters as would enable us to construct a doctrine of sin. Certainly, there is as yet no conclusive agreement as to the relations of instincts and intellect, of imagination and will. Consider, for instance, the question of repression. Mr. Moxon is clearly opposed to it: "Any attempt to repress the instincts, though it is even to this day advocated by many moralists, is doomed to failure, and must be productive of disaster." Now, such a principle as "no negative without a positive" may be sound enough, but sublimation is not a short-cut to true ethical practice. In the majority of cases it must be a long and diffi-

cult process, and in that process there will be involved acts of repression which, though they be regarded as not an end in themselves, but a means to an end, will be real negatives. Mr. Moxon does assert the place and importance of the conscious action of the will, and that ethical judgment must extend to the unconscious as well as to the conscious, but it is no disparagement of this chapter of his to say that while we are at the beginning of these researches, which are of the nature of pioneering work, we cannot advance with the full assurance of being able to build, with the aid of this new material, a satisfactory dogmatic. At the same time, it should be recognized that his definitions do not bind us down to one particular solution of difficulties that arise in connexion with the new psychology.

Psychology raises ethical problems in respect of the characteristics and tendencies of human nature, and thence we may pass on to the study of ethics as a discipline which has its place as a section of theology, since ethics cannot be limited to relationships that exist within humanity, but are adequately apprehended and can only be fully expressed when account is taken of man's relationship to God. This means the linking-up of ethics with dogmatics, which may prove a stumbling-block to those who object to the introduction of theological presuppositions, but is inevitable for the Christian who realizes that it belongs to the very essence of the Christian religion to view the moral life of man in the light of the revelation of God in Christ, so that ethics must have a theological character, since the true life of man, the life which, as eternal, possesses an autonomy which is not to be looked for if human relationships form a closed circle impossible to transcend, is grounded in God's creative and redemptive activity. This interrelation of dogmatics and ethics is clearly discernible in the Pelagian controversy; and perhaps the chief general difference between Augustine and Pelagius is that, whereas Pelagius is anxious that man should have standing-ground in which his moral life is not in debt to God—not, indeed, separate from Him, but yet with a measure of real independence, Augustine knows nothing at all of a moral life which is not at every stage God's gift to man. No wonder Pelagius took offence at the famous prayer : *Da quod iubes, et iube quod vis ;* it struck right at the conception which he had formed of the character of the moral life.

As between Pelagius and Augustine there can be no doubt that the former far more easily enlists popular sympathy. Nor would it be fair to say that this is due to any lenient view of sin which he took. For Pelagius was interested in moral reform with all the sincerity of an austere nature. He had not the

smallest desire to make light of sin; on the contrary, he was anxious to teach men that they must apply themselves with all earnestness to the struggle against sin. He was, moreover, no follower of Origen in the Alexandrian's universalism. And yet it is not the intolerance of theologians trained in the Augustinian tradition which has been responsible for the connexion between Pelagianism and lax views of sin. There is a real inner connexion, implicit in the positions which Pelagius took up, though quite hidden from him. The exceeding sinfulness of sin is not appreciable when sin is regarded as so much of an individual affair, and when, in connexion with the individual's moral progress, the work which God does is thrown so much into the background. But if the reaction of God from sin, visible not only in penalties upon sin, but in the grace which is sin's antidote, is not emphasized, if the significance of the relation between sin and Christ, expressed in the *O felix culpa*, is not given its full weight, then a view of sin which would have greatly shocked Pelagius is not at all unlikely to appear. Pelagianism has worked itself out to become a more dangerous heresy in the modern world than it ever was at the time of its birth.

Now, for Augustine, the necessity of grace was the complement of his belief concerning original sin and its results. And the Augustinian doctrine is not one that can easily be accepted as a whole or easily broken up into parts. The system hangs together from the initial predestination to life of a certain number to the gift of final perseverance which ensures that that number should remain intact. Yet there is hardly a point where obvious criticisms and reservations do not suggest themselves, and those not in unimportant respects, but for the preserving of an intelligent faith in the justice and the love of God. Mr. Moxon brings them out forcibly. Thus, of the Augustinian doctrine of freewill he says that it is "little more than the bare assertion of the existence of the will"; of his doctrine of original sin that it implies the inclusive humanity of Adam, the original guilt of each one of Adam's descendants, and the just condemnation of them all, apart from actual sin, to eternal punishment; of his theory of predestination and grace that it involves the passing-over, if not the definite reprobation, of a portion—which is, indeed, for Augustine, the greater portion—of mankind. Sometimes I think that he presses the case against Augustine too far. Augustine's interest in the doctrine of irresistible grace, and, indeed, his conception of grace, when we remember his devotion to St. Paul's words in Rom. v. 5—"the love of God shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost"—are not properly reproduced when, in

criticism of that doctrine, Mr. Moxon says: "It would be entirely contrary to God's purpose if Grace forced men to act in a certain way apart from their deliberate choice. His object is not so much to get good actions performed as to cause upright characters to be made, and holiness under compulsion would have neither merit nor value." And as to his criticism on Augustine's definition of freedom as "lasting dependence on God," and his contrary assertion that "*our moral freedom consists in the possibility of following either inclination*"—towards good as well as towards evil, then, unless we are prepared to say that moral freedom is something which belongs entirely to this life and is in no sense itself an ethical ideal, but merely the condition of the achieving of ethical ideals, we must leave room for Augustine's description. And it is very noteworthy that much later in the book, when he is dealing with the evolution of personality, Mr. Moxon fully recognizes this. "Freewill," he says, "can only strictly be predicated of the final stages of human evolution. It is the ultimate product of progress. Absolute freedom is not attained until the will is entirely consonant and identified with the will of God. Then, and not till then, is freewill perfect and complete." Freewill, therefore, cannot be regarded as no more than the *possibilitas utriusque*. There is another point in which Mr. Moxon decides too hastily against Augustine—in his rejection of the idea of sin as the penalty of sin. It is possible to hold that Augustine's statement of this idea in connexion with the doctrine of original sin is open to strong criticism, and yet to maintain that he grasped a truth which is part of the moral ordering of things.

Mr. Moxon has, of course, much to say in criticism of Pelagius; nevertheless, the general impression he conveys to me is of greater sympathy with him than with Augustine, and Semipelagianism, despite its avoidance of Pelagius's characteristic tenets as regards original sin and pre-eminent grace, is, as expounded by him, more of a reaction from the views of the African Father than from those of his opponent. The account given of Semipelagianism is exceedingly attractive, and whereas it is sometimes urged as a reproach against the mediæval Western Church and the Council of Trent that they abandoned Augustine in favour of a Semipelagian doctrine of human nature, Mr. Moxon regards the fact very differently. And many a reader will probably come to the conclusion that a Christian ought to have no hesitation in allying himself with Semipelagianism, and not with Augustine, in the doctrines of sin and of grace.

If it were simply an abstract question, a problem in dog-

matics, that conclusion might be allowed. But that is what the question can never be. It is bound up with experimental religion, and in that sphere it is much less easy to give the verdict against Augustine. It may be said that Augustine's religious experience was not normal, and that is true; yet Augustine's belief that at no point was it possible to say, "Here the will, independently of grace, decided for grace," is one which possesses no exclusive connexion with the kind of experience of conversion which had been his. Semipelagianism is not contradictory of that belief; Mr. Moxon shows that the tendency to deny prevenient grace which for a time was common in Southern Gaul did not remain a feature of Semipelagianism. Yet whenever salvation is conceived of dualistically as a work which is both divine and human, seeing that grace does so much, and the will so much, the same spirit is present as that which in Pelagianism proper denies prevenient grace. And though Mr. Moxon's own views on the matter lead him to accept the doctrine of prevenient grace in a sense determined by the fact of divine immanence, he does not appear to disapprove of the Pelagian denial of prevenient grace when he writes: "They saw that, however necessary Divine assistance might be for a good work as a whole, at the bottom was a good act or movement performed by the will prior to the Divine assistance." But this is to resolve the dilemma in favour of man in a way that raises great religious difficulties.

Where Mr. Moxon's book, with all its merits of description and analysis, seems to me to come short of being a contribution of the first order to the historical and dogmatic question of which Chapters III. to V. treat, is in its failure to make it clear that, despite all that is intellectually challengeable in his system, Augustine is spiritually at the centre, and that Christian piety is not concerned to stake out claims for the preservation of its own independence in this or that respect. Augustine has an understanding of religion which so much outweighs in importance his dogmatic exaggerations that, whereas it is of no particular interest to the Church that Semipelagianism should be the creed of the intellect of her members, it is of very real interest, and more, that Augustine should control their hearts. A most unsatisfactory dichotomy, doubtless, but one that keeps worse evils at a distance.

In conclusion, let it be said that, well-written as the book is, it suffers here and there from a lack of care and guardedness in some of its statements. Whatever we might expect it to be, it is not at all a fact which should be dogmatically asserted that the Calvinistic view of human nature "is more paralyzing to the conscience" than any other theory of sin that has ever

been held. Augustine did not invent the phrase "original sin": it occurs in Tertullian, *De Anima*, 41. Pelagius is said to have taught that acts of sin were isolated factors with no bearing on the character of the doer, though in an earlier passage we are told that he admitted racial deteriorations as a result of sinning, "even as an individual becomes worse through indulgence in sinful habits," which appears to be the view ascribed to Pelagius, and not simply a comparison introduced by the author. The paragraph which closes § 11 of Chapter VI. has been written in such a way as to imply that the Council of Trent preceded the Reformation. Even if the Reformers, and not Augustine, may be said to have introduced the idea of total depravity, they did not introduce that of "the necessary damnation of infants dying unbaptized." Mr. Moxon has shown earlier that Augustine taught that such "must of necessity be lost." And a reference to the relevant pages in Dr. Tennant's *Origin of Sin* will show that it is not by means of the doctrine of Divine immanence that he safeguards the independence of the human will. On the contrary, it is the immanental idea which he regards as verging "towards the pantheistic," which exactly reverses what Mr. Moxon says.

A book on a subject which raises so many and important issues opens the door to criticism on points both of principle and detail. But for bringing the subject, not too often handled as a scientific study, before our notice, for the material which he has collected, and for the stimulus of judgments in which, to whatever extent we do or do not agree with them, the desire to do justice to more than one set of claims is apparent, the author will rightly receive an expression of gratitude rather than of criticism as this review's last word.

J. K. Mozley.

NOTICES

THE ROMAN FAMILY AND *De Ritu Nuptiarum:* Title XXIII. (2). From the Digest of Justinian. By the Rev. S. A. Leathley, D.D. (Oxon.), LL.B. (Manchester). Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Broad Street. 1922. 6s. 1 vol., 99 pp.

This little book is divided into two parts, (1) a sketch of family relations in ancient Rome; and (2) a useful translation, with text and commentary, of Title XXIII. 2 of the Digest, on the law of marriage and divorce, a seasonable topic at the present time.

The preliminary sketch is interesting, but not profound, and though rather too discursive, has much in it to the point which will repay the reader. It suffers from an almost total absence of references. In it are traced the gradual steps by which the old high family morality of the Romans broke down towards the close of the Republic, until it finally became what we find it in the pages of such writers as Tacitus and Juvenal and Lucian. The first of these pointedly contrasts it with the pure morality of the German tribes, and Galen marvels at the sexual code of the despised Christians.

In his strictures on the facility of divorce that took the place of the ancient Roman strictness, which for five hundred years allowed no divorce, the author might appositely have quoted Martial's:

> Aut minus, aut certe non plus tricesima lux est,
> Et nubit decimo iam Telesilla viro.

In the matter of the Roman law of divorce the author points out the inequality of treatment between man and wife, though he considers it less faulty in this respect than our own. He does not, however, allude to the striking rescript of Antoninus (Marcus, probably), recorded by St. Augustine only, in which, replying to a husband who charged his wife Eupasia with infidelity, he asks whether he had set his wife a good example in this particular: "For it is manifestly unfair," he adds, "that he should demand from her a chastity which he does not practise himself." We should also have expected a reference to the remarkable action of Callistus, Bishop of Rome, in giving the sanction of the Church to senatorial unions forbidden by Roman law—a striking parallel to the late Pope's *Ne temere* bull.

There are some slips here and there. Who is Prætextus, coupled with Seneca (p. 23)? Did Juvenal write plays (p. 75)? *Oratio* (pp. 57, 88) is not a rescript, but a speech in the Senate on legal matters, subsequently embodied in a *S.C.* The "Falcidian Fourth" was not confined to children but applied to any heir. Why devotée with an accent? The English is occasionally curious—*e.g.* "breaches of barbarity" for "outbursts of barbarity"; a law of "far greater extending influence"; in the case of "prodigals, madmen, deaf, dumb, or incurably diseased," where evidently "*the* deaf and dumb" or "deaf and dumb persons" are meant. There is no index, an inexcusable fault.

C. R. HAINES.

CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS OF THE SECOND CENTURY IN THEIR RELATION TO MODERN THOUGHT. By Philip Carrington, B.A. (Cantab.), M.A. (Nov. Zel.), Harwell Scholar of Selwyn College, Cambridge. London, S.P.C.K. 7s. 6d. Pp. 151.

An interesting book with a somewhat misleading title. The words "in their relation to modern thought" do not appear on the cover nor

on the first page, and they are the *raison d'être* of the book. Besides this the discussion is by no means confined to second-century Christianity, but includes much that comes earlier and a little of what is later.

In a brief and modest Preface the author explains that the word "apologetics" rather than "apologists" has been chosen as it "left it open to treat the subject in a general manner." At the same time, one would expect to find in the chapter which deals particularly with the apologists of the period mention made of them all. This is not the case. Quadratus is included, and the brief fragment of his Apology preserved by Eusebius is given in full, though it scarcely touches on the subjects treated of later in the book. On the other hand, no mention is made of Aristo of Pella, of Miltiades, of Hermias, nor of Melito. The omission of the last-named is noteworthy, as the considerable fragments which we have of his would have given additional material for discussion. The omission of Hermias is perhaps natural because of the uncertainty of the date of his *Διασυρμὸς τῶν ἔξω φιλοσόφων*. Besides Quadratus the Apologists mentioned are Aristides, Justin, Athenagoras, Theophilus, Tatian ("his *To the Greeks* is just as unpardonably savage as *The Tale of a Tub*"), Minucius Felix, Tertullian, and the writer of the *Epistle to Diognetus*. Summaries are given, necessarily brief, but enough, we hope, to induce some to read them in a full English translation, or, better still, in the originals. Anyone, for example, who has read Minucius Felix's dialogue *Octavius* will have a better idea of the mutual attitude of Christians and pagans in the latter half of the second century than any that he will have gained from a general study of ecclesiastical history.

The four succeeding chapters treat respectively of the point of view from which the early Christians, especially the apologists of the second century, regarded the Old Testament, contemporary heathen philosophy, the superstition of the popular religion, and the relations between Church and State. The last two chapters, on "The Faith of Christianity" and "Christianity and Modern Thought," are more general. The Index is not very full, but will probably be sufficient for the needs of the readers of this brief volume.

It should be mentioned that to the beginning of each chapter the author has prefixed well-chosen extracts from the "Apologists," in which they touch on the special point of the chapter in question.

Mr. Carrington has the capacity, so useful in writing on historical subjects, of seeing parallels in practice or opinion between ancient and modern times. True, he sometimes overstrains the idea. For example, on p. 105, he says: "The State" (in modern times) "makes a claim which is just as uncompromising, even if it is not expressed in language so amazing." To describe George IV. (the example given) as "our most religious and gracious King" can hardly be said to be on a par with calling "that sinister beast Domitian 'Dominus et Deus Noster.'" Often, however, a happy parallelism is suggested by a brief phrase or even a word, as (p. 80) "Rome and her *Kultur*"; (p. 75) "the objections of Celsus read as if they were penned yesterday for the Rationalist Press Association"; (p. 76) "The age was sick because it was without God, and so is ours. The idea came back to them with the belief in the Incarnation, and so it will to us."

Sometimes it is a contrast which is vividly expressed. For example, in a note (p. 102) on the pagan conception of matter:

"'The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak.' Any other

religious teacher of the age would have said, 'The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is strong.' Heathenism regarded the flesh as an obstacle to being good; Christianity regarded it as material for being good with."

There are a number of points, not of great importance for the argument of the book as a whole, about which we are constrained to dissent from the views of the author. A few examples may be given. The "judgment-seat" in Acts xviii. 17 is explained (p. 13) as the judgment-seat of the Jewish synagogue at Corinth. It is, of course, true that the judgment-seat is not said in this verse to have been Gallio's, but in the preceding verses the judgment-seat has been twice mentioned, and is obviously that of the proconsul.

Again, on p. 56 the state of religion in Israel in the time of Elijah is thus described:

"It was to a crowd of fetish-worshippers, dancing madly round the altars of Baal or the hangings of the maypole (*sic*), dedicating their children by fire to Moloch, building houses in the sacrifice of their first-born, credulous of taboo, trustful in their war-god Jehovah, whom they carried into battle in a wooden box, that Elijah came. Civilisation, such as it was, was against him; yet to Elijah, child of the desert, and cousin to the wandering Arabs, the great secret was given that Jehovah was not in the earthquake, but in the whispering of a small voice. And this conviction and unshakable faith grew till the whole nation was impregnated with it."

This passage appears to us full of *petitiones principii*, and to be a caricature of the religion of the Hebrews in Elijah's time, if even one of the Psalms be from David, or if the Song in Judges v. be (as it is admitted to be) contemporary with the events it celebrates. Even monolatry is not fetish-worship. We had thought, too, that the modern idea was that ethical monotheism was the special product of the age of Hosea and Amos; here it is brought back to Elijah. Perhaps it begins with Abraham.

We must also demur to the sentences on p. 86 suggesting a parallelism between Mithraism and Freemasonry. Mr. Carrington probably knows more about the former than about the latter. He does not seem to be aware that the atheistic Freemasonry of some parts of the Continent, which is no doubt "a definite antagonist of Christianity," has no relations whatsoever with the theistic Freemasonry of England and elsewhere. No English Freemason would accept his definition of Freemasonry as being merely "a society for mutual benefit." It is a *religious* society. The epithet makes all the difference. Again, why should the mysteries of birth be described (p. 90) as "the most holy and horrible of human secrets"? Some of the results of the abuses connected with them are no doubt horrible, but the sentence seems to us to imply more than that.

On the whole, we have to thank the author for a book which will stimulate thought, and develop interest in the Christian writings of a period not so well known as it should be.

J. M. HARDEN.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY. By Guido de Ruggiero. Translated by A. Howard Hannay, B.A., and R. G. Collingwood, M.A., F.S.A., Fellow and Lecturer of Pembroke College, Oxford. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1921. Pp. 402. 16s.

The fame of Benedetto Croce, and the naturalization of his thought in our own philosophy of art and history to-day, have brought home to us

the existence of a very active idealistic school in Italy. But little has been known hitherto of the actual work of such writers as Giovanni Gentile and Guido de Ruggiero. In the present volume we have a careful translation of a work of Ruggiero's which saw the light in 1912, and is a survey of European philosophy from 1850 onwards.

But we have here no unprejudiced description of the rise and fall of metaphysical speculation, but rather a polemic of the most trenchant character; it is phrased throughout as the proclamation of the one and only truth from the point of view of one who has attained the goal; it presents just one criterion of judgment on the various schools of thought in Germany, France, England, America, and Italy, by the standard of which all metaphysics are tried and found wanting; and that criterion is the philosophy of absolute Immanence itself—in short, the position of Gentile. Philosophers from Kant downwards are ranged as valuable or worthless just in so far as their systems prepare the way for the great illumination to come, or, on the other hand, admit elements which obstruct its advance.

And what is this philosophy, apart from its æsthetic teaching? It claims to be the inevitable completion of the criticism of the Kantian movement which culminated in Hegel. It banishes the concept of transcendence altogether, which Kant in the noumenon left outside his critique; Hegel, it is true, professed to suppress it, but in fact dualism dwells in the heart of his logic. The absolute Immanentist can afford to be gentle with Naturalism and Positivism, though it can hardly be said that Ruggiero is, for, absurd and crude as they are, yet they battered obsolete ideologies and all theories which depreciate facts and attempt to anticipate facts by thoughts. At least, they expressed a form of Immanence, empirical in Mill, phenomenal in the Neo-Kantians, intuitional in Bergson, though they were all alike doomed to break out ultimately into transcendence, now positing a "nature," now a religious object, now a social ideal. All alike fail to solve the problems of nature and history, without the introduction of anything outside the flow of the human spirit, and by their very failure point the way to Absolute Immanence, which alone can do it. This teaching claims direct descent from Kant's *a priori synthesis*, to which, it is ingenuously said, Hegel gave a new significance, and by it led the way to the Copernican conception of the world, which "in logic is directed against the thing-in-itself, in action against the heteronomy of the 'ought-to-be,' and of all abstract ideals." The human spirit is the individualized manifestation of the Eternal in the form of contingency from moment to moment. It is "actuality, concreteness, search and attainment, aspiration and achievement." There can be no abstract; "the abstract simply does not exist, it is an optical delusion produced by thought projecting itself in advance of the process of thinking." Does it not seem more difficult to envisage the world of absolute Immanence, than that of the humbler idealism in which the mind made nature out of a material that it did not make?

In German philosophy Ruggiero, starting from the Naturalism that succeeded the classic idealism, examines the various types of thought that rested on immediate experience—Schuppe, Mach, Wundt, and Brentano. None offer a reasonable explanation of experience. Eucken, for instance, in seeking a foothold for the Spirit above subjectivity, and Munsterberg's mystic vision of ultimate reality attained by an act of will, are vague and unsatisfying. The concept of "value" is "a mere

evasion, an ambiguous term between an affirmation and a negation, that betrays an inconsistency in consciousness itself."

In France it was Lachelier who succeeded best in basing on Kant the conception of a world of creative spontaneity above that of mechanical causation; self-affirmation and freedom were his watchwords, and he and Weber are the heralds of absolute Immanence. In a way they lead up to Bergson, but Bergson's "fundamental vice" is his Intuitionism, for Intuition must have a transcendent object. His doctrine of matter as an interruption of the *élan vital* shows that he regards life as nature, not as dialectic. Blondel, again, though his Activism is similar to Gentile's, fails to "resolve the transcendent"; that is to say, he allows God a separate existence for Himself apart from His manifestation in humanity, and so far fails of the goal of absolute Immanence.

After playing with the English Empiricists in a way that will delight all Idealists, Ruggiero deals at length with the Hegelians. Green and McTaggart mix up Plato with Hegel, resolve the world into the Unity of the Idea, and lead to a conflict between Idea and Experience that produces Bradley's scepticism. Royce, with his "diverse processes and multiple individualities," goes astray; for pluralism calls for an abstract centre outside thought, which can only be the God of Theism.

The Italian philosophy is represented as an historical development from Machiavelli to Gioberti. The revival of speculation in the nineteenth century leads on to the new metaphysic of Spaventa, "whose ideal is the expression of reality in terms of the human spirit and nothing else, and the resolute denial of all transcendence," which it is held that Croce and Gentile have worked out satisfactorily.

The scope of this book is immense; but you must be an absolute Immanentist to sympathize with its audacity. As an early Italian Hegelian Vera said: "Hegelianism can only be imparted to an Hegelian," and when asked: "How does one become an Hegelian?" had to answer that Hegelians were born not made, so this later teaching is difficult even to conceive. In the light of it (or the dark of it) we can understand the strong reaction to Thomism in the Roman Church, and its enforced propagation as a sane system of metaphysics.

But however little we may sympathize with the point of view of the writer, or be affected by his ideals, it must be admitted that there is no book in which the streams of thought in Europe and America have been so fully and subtly compared as the expressions of one spirit. The criticism of Naturalism throughout is exceedingly acute and telling.

W. J. Ferrar.

History of the People of England. Vol. I., 55 B.C.-1485 A.D. By Alice Drayton Greenwood. The Bede Histories, Series III. S.P.C.K. 8s. 6d. net.

The excuse proffered by the editor of this series for the addition of yet another to the formidable array of school history textbooks is that scarcely any of its rivals already in the field give an adequate and intelligent account of the work of the Church in the growth and development of the English nation. The indictment is true and the excuse therefore adequate. Unfortunately, the treatment of Church questions in the volume before us, though full and interesting, does not seem to us conceived on the right lines. It is too insular. We turned to the Index and

failed to find the names of either Gregory or Innocent! It is true the Index is a very bad one, and to some extent maligns the book. A good deal is, in fact, said about the mediæval papacy, and much of it is true. Yet the balance seems to us wrong. All our history teaching has been too insular, and nowhere is there a finer opportunity for redressing the balance than in the treatment of the mediæval papacy, the greatest instrument for human good that the world has ever seen, as the present Master of Balliol—not a "Roman" propagandist by any means—has called it. We wish that Miss Greenwood had read his lectures on "Church and State in the Middle Ages" before writing her book, for we cannot but suspect that she did not do so.

Subject to this criticism the book is well done, and there is an excellent account of mediæval town life.

Certain other points are of importance to the teacher. There are 371 rather closely printed pages (about 480 words to a page). The chapters, averaging nine pages apiece, have very little in the way of section headings. These two facts would tend to make it rather stiff reading for boys, who are much assisted by an attractive and discouraged by an unattractive and formidable-looking page. Perhaps girls are made of sterner stuff.

D. C. Somervell.

Yorkshiremen of the Restoration. By J. S. Fletcher. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 10s. 6d.

Mr. Fletcher in this book tells us the story of twelve worthies: some of whom, such as the Marquess of Halifax, Sir Henry Slingsby, or Lord Fairfax, are well-known persons in history; others of whom, such as Nathan Drake or Hodgson of Scarborough, will be known to few, probably, even in Yorkshire itself.

But Mr. Fletcher makes both classes interesting. For he uses local history, or unexplored circumstances, to supplement or correct our knowledge of the former class; and he uses the history of the characters of the latter class to supplement or correct our ideas on contemporary circumstances.

Thus, in the first case, for instance, we find Obadiah Walker rescued from the suffocating clutch of Macaulay, and presented to us in the light of an accomplished scholar, and a close friend of the famous Dr. Radcliffe.

Thus, in the second case, we find the mere facts of the sieges and campaigns of the Civil War illustrated by a picture of an actual siege, that of Pontefract, in the diary of Nathan Drake. And how vividly the seventeenth century lives before us! "*May 11th*, 1645.—*We had 2 learned sermonds . . . The Lord give us grace to follow them. We killed 2 of the enemyes from the Round tower.*" From sources such as this we are taught a great deal. We can enjoy what might be called perhaps a sort of *inverted eternity:* we can think ourselves backwards, and breathe the atmosphere of other centuries.

We have often heard that the Quakers were persecuted, but Mr. Fletcher tells us of an actual Quaker who was persecuted, and informs us that in 1660 there were no less than 505 Quakers in York Castle as prisoners! This is valuable; we remember the particular when we forget the general.

Bishop Creighton says somewhere that the true history of a country is to be found in its local history. And yet this fact has been too often

forgotten. We need more local histories, and such as shall neither frighten us by their prolixity nor repel by their superficiality. For the history of an English county is as important for the history of England as the history of England is for the history of Europe.

Mr. Fletcher recognizes this truth and acts upon it. For the rest, we cannot altogether praise his style and treatment. He is in danger sometimes of being even dull: of loving detail for its own sake, of indulging in superfluous surmises—and starting unnecessary hares merely for the sake of hunting and never killing them!

Who cares if Dr. Nathaniel Johnson killed Nathan Drake or no? We might as well write a monograph on "Who Killed Cock Robin?" and quote St. Francis's sermons in evidence!

No. Local history should never be dull. For its very *raison d'être* is to be, as it were, a lantern to illumine the paths of a student—"*Now that the fields are dank, and ways are mire*"; we mean whenever he is failing to realize, and to appreciate, a period.

But we do not infer from this that Mr. Fletcher's lamp has no oil in it. We would only say that perhaps, sometimes, he allows it to *smoke* a little!

In general, however, his wick burns bravely; and, as he holds it there aloft, it casts many a bright beam, over here a fountain, there a thicket; here a palace, there a deep morass—making them appear all the more vividly to our eyes from the very fact that the country is sometimes an unfamiliar country, and the land a "land that is very far off."

H. V. F. Somerset.

Trent: Four Lectures on Practical Aspects of the Council of Trent. By Frederick Joseph Kinsman. Longmans, Green and Co. 1921.

Dr. Kinsman's is an able book, which is the reason why it displeases us. For it contains much that seems to us misleading at the same time that it contains much with which we most heartily agree. Those who have enough knowledge to discount its errors will gain much from its perusal: but we fear for those who, while able to enjoy its excellent style and many valuable arguments, may be unable to see that all its contents are not of equal value, and that though one may drain from it some most excellent wine, yet a time comes when the cup is filled with poison.

We have not space to prove this charge of unreliability at length. But anyone who will consult the original authorities, or even Ranke's work and its appendix, will see what we mean.

The book is divided into four parts dealing with the Council itself, with the Protestant Reformation in general, with the significance of Trent, and with "the Tridentine attitude."

The two middle portions seem to us the best worth reading. They contain things that it would be well for many Protestants, and even for many English Churchmen, to take to heart: clever and often true criticisms of the Reformation; able and usually very happily phrased pleas for a Faith which must be at once exact yet broad, historical yet progressive, strict yet sympathetic, Catholick and yet uncompromising; in fact, Dr. Kinsman puts before us the noblest ideals of his Church, and with these we to a large extent agree.

But he ties these on to the Council of Trent, as though they sprang

from, and were a part of, it. And is this true? We should not be prepared to say so. To couple the rather sordid politics and plans of the sixteenth-century Papacy and Empire with the fundamentals of the Faith, as being their parents, or at any rate their revindicators, seems somewhat strange.

It is true that Trent was the instrument by which many excellent ideals and doctrines were given to the world; but Dr. Kinsman has tried to make it a noble, or at any rate a spontaneous, instrument. And this we deny.

The Papacy called a Council, but it was forced to do so. Its reputation was so low that it must show that it could face Christendom, or, if not Christendom, the Catholick part of it. It called a Council, therefore; but with what trembling! Its own bishops, its own most devoted subjects were clamouring for reform; and beyond them were the Protestants demanding revision, not only of its discipline, but of its doctrine. And Charles V. acquiesced in this. Dr. Kinsman makes Charles a political monster breaking into the shrine of the Faith. But is this just?

Charles acted from mixed motives, no doubt. He was a pious Catholick, but he was also the ruler of many thousands of enraged Protestants. He therefore wanted a settlement partly for political reasons. But surely not wholly. Is it not conceivable that he believed that the Protestants really had some truth on their side, and that he thought it not only expedient but right that the Church should attempt to satisfy them?

Charles was not only thinking of politics any more than the Pope was only thinking of religion.

But, in any case, the Council made no effort to come to an agreement with the Protestants, in spite of what Dr. Kinsman says about the Church's "sympathy." The truth is that the Pope *captured* the Council and turned it from a bugbear into being the Papacy's chief weapon. Through his legates, moreover, he came to an understanding with the temporal rulers; and henceforth the Catholick Sovereigns and the Pope were to work hand in hand. The doctrines of the Church were rendered more precise, the power of the Papacy was acknowledged superior to councils, the independence of the bishops was curbed, and Rome went forth to war armed cap-à-pie. Dr. Kinsman speaks of the Papacy as being hindered by politics: but it was the Popes who had sought political aid. Already of Pius IV. it had been said "questo dice che senza l' autorita dei principi non si puo conservare quella dei pontifici." Meanwhile peace had not been achieved without a struggle: "alii praelati ingeminabant 'Exeat, Exeat,' et alii 'anathema sit,' ad quos Cranatensis conversus respondit '*anathema vos estis.*'" It is wonderful that Rome has survived her councils. Nevertheless, at last was signed what Symonds calls "the marriage contract of ecclesiastical and secular absolutism."

But we have not space to follow—or rather not to follow—Dr. Kinsman any further. We recommend his book as a suggestive piece of criticism, a brilliant plea, an imperfect sketch, and a delightful piece of "reading."

What Dr. Kinsman has said, he has said well; but (we may be forgiven perhaps if we add that) he has shown even greater ability in what he has omitted.

Finally, there is one of his errors which we cannot altogether let pass: we refer to that in which he speaks of the Church of England as being a branch of Continental Protestantism.

H. V. F. Somerset.

THE OTHER SIDE OF DEATH: A STUDY IN CHRISTIAN ESCHATOLOGY. By Ronald G. Macintyre, M.A., D.D. (Edin.). Macmillan. 1920.

This is an attempt to restate the doctrine of Christian Eschatology in a systematic form, covering the field as a whole—a task, we may remark, demanding qualifications of an exceptionally exacting and searching kind. Dr. Macintyre does not profess to deal with the general question of immortality, but only with those aspects of it leading up to, and embraced within, the Christian Revelation. Our author feels acutely the need for such a work in view of the demand inside and outside the Church for definite teaching on the subjects of the Second Advent and Future Destiny, and he rightly points to a weakness in the mass of literature which is being poured out when he says that many of these books are either dominated by a literalism which ignores the historical conditions in which New Testament doctrine took shape, or they proceed so independently of Scripture teaching that they more or less fail to appeal to Christian faith. The book before us is addressed to clergy and the large class of intelligent Christian laity who are rightly demanding from the Church some definite teaching on these subjects.

We may say at once that whilst by no means agreeing with Dr. Macintyre in many of the positions he seeks to establish, we can none the less recommend his work to the sympathetic study of the people for whom he writes, and there is no doubt but that such a reading will prove helpful and stimulating.

The survival value of the book will turn, we think, upon the author's presentation of the doctrine of Conditional Immortality, or, as he prefers to call it, the doctrine of Potential Immortality. It would be difficult to find in modern literature a more carefully weighed and persuasively put statement of the Conditionalist view, which in the hands of our author undergoes certain modifications intended to meet objections to the theory. Dr. Macintyre is keenly alive to the force of the arguments urged against the statement of the doctrine by its modern advocates, notably Edward White in England, W. R. Huntingdon in America, Edward Petavel in Switzerland, and Richard Rothe in Germany. How far Dr. Macintyre, by dissociating his theory of Potential Immortality from certain aspects of the subject which belong to the theory of Conditional Immortality, succeeds in commending the former as a substitute for the orthodox view, we must leave his readers to judge. He tells us that Conditionalism in some form is the only view which does adequate justice to reason and revelation if the Church is to have any doctrine at all on final destiny. Is it necessary, however, we ask, for the Church to decide definitely for any particular view? We are well aware that popular eschatology is a mass of contradictions, judged in the cold light of critical philosophical acumen. From another point of view, however, the Church would be ill advised to abandon its seemingly inconsistent and illogical statements based upon Biblical data, and thus gain intellectual consistency at the expense of certain aspects of the truth dimly adumbrated in the eschatology of the Bible. After all, we need ever to remind ourselves that now we see as in a mirror darkly, and therefore over-hasty dogmatism is the last thing wanted, even though intelligent clergy and laity may demand final decisions on disputed points in the interests of clear thought. The Church had far better say quite frankly that we do not know. At

all costs we must hold fast to the Biblical data. We are at liberty to subject them to a critical analysis, and any light scholarship can shed upon the subject will be welcome, but in the last analysis the quest is beyond our finite ken. We must wait and see.

Whilst the Church, then, is not bound to commit itself to any definite decision in favour either of Annihilation, Restoration, Final Retribution, or any particular view, and whilst we may agree with the conclusion arrived at by Dr. James Orr, in his *Christian View of God and the World*, that we have not the elements of a complete solution and we ought not to attempt it, at the same time one thing is clear, and needs to be preached in season and out of season—viz., that the whole emphasis of Christ's preaching lay upon the moral and spiritual issues of this our life of probation. Apart, then, from all curious speculation concerning the ultimate fate of our neighbours, let us look to our own deeds done in the body, whether they be good or evil.

If at the same time we seek intellectual stimulation on the problems of the Other Side of Death, Dr. Macintyre's work will help us much.

H. Maurice Relton.

Religion and the New Psychology: A Psychoanalytic Study of Religion. By Walter Samuel Swisher, B.D. George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., London. 1 vol. Pp. 255. 10s. 6d. net.

There is a class of literature inspired by psychoanalysis which tends to bring the whole psychoanalytic method into disrepute by its dogmatism, its inaccuracy, and its neglect of all other aspects of psychology than the psychoanalytic. We have no hesitation in stating that Mr. Swisher's book belongs to this class.

While it would be impossible to justify adequately this condemnation without devoting a greater space to the review of this book than we consider it deserves, a general idea of its defects may be given by a few quotations. "Jesus, except for certain Masochistic or self-abasement tendencies, seems to have been free from neurosis" (p. 34). "Paul is the victim of a heavy neurosis. It is his 'thorn in the flesh.' His own love of life is violently repressed. . . . He is sadistic, derives pleasure from the suffering of others" (p. 35). "So far as I am aware, no one would attempt to interpret all the phenomena of religious life as instances of sex-perversion" (p. 90). (Apparently Mr. Swisher has not heard of the Erotogenesists.) "We cannot quite say that these celestial visions are the 'delusions of grandeur' of the paranoiac, but they have at least a similar mechanism back of them" (p. 95). "The youth . . . covers every outhouse with obscene writings and pictures, which are nothing but the phallic symbols of our primordial ancestors, the basis of those very symbols we retain in sublimated form in our churches" (p. 211). ". . . The anxiety dream means 'I would rather suffer the mental torture of a nightmare than face reality.' This may be hard to prove, but it is so" (p. 242).

We have no doubt that much light may be thrown on the psychological problems of religion by psychoanalysis, but this is not the way to do it.

R. H. Thouless, M.A.

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